The CCJ’s consequential orders should recognise that the President, and his Cabinet, shall remain in office until the next election

Jul 05, 2019 Letters

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DEAR EDITOR,

The membership of the Commonwealth community reflects a diversity of constitutional systems ranging from absolute and constitutional monarchies to parliamentary and presidential republics. Of the 53 member states of the Commonwealth, which are located in Asia, Africa, Australasia (Oceania), Europe, North and South America and the Caribbean, only one is an absolute monarchy where the Sultan of Brunei is also the country’s Prime Minister. A majority of the countries (31) are parliamentary democracies, including some which are constitutional monarchies (UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) in which the Head of State is the British monarch and an elected Prime Minister and Cabinet administer the government, while others (for e.g. India, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago) are parliamentary republics where a mostly ceremonial President is Head of State and a Prime Minister, who is elected by the Parliament, leads the government which derives its legitimacy from, and is accountable to, the parliament. There is also a more popular form of republicanism within the Commonwealth (21 countries), mostly located in Africa, which is Presidential Republicanism in which the roles of Head of State and Head of Government are combined in the person of the Executive President who is directly elected by the people. The presidential republic is also the dominant form of government in the continental Americas with 19 of the 22 sovereign states being presidential republics.
Guyana’s constitutional evolution has seen its birth, in 1966, as a Westminster type constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament, a government and Cabinet led by a Prime Minister, which is accountable to the parliament, and with the British monarch as Head of State, represented by her Governor-General. In 1970, Guyana became a parliamentary republic with a President who was elected by the National Assembly for a 5-year term and possessed mostly ceremonial powers as Head of State and transitioned to a Presidential Republic in 1980, with an Executive President who was elected directly by the people. In the process of transitioning between the different forms of government, the constitution has been amended and reformed and recent developments seem to demand further and urgent reform. This short history of constitutional engineering and growth has now led us to the passage of a no confidence motion against the government and the possible forced termination of the constitutionally mandated term of a duly elected majority government.
Less than a decade ago, during a previous administration, parliament had moved a motion of no-confidence against a Cabinet minister following the killing and wounding of several citizens in Linden and the President then maintained that he had confidence in his minister and that parliament had no ability to force the resignation or dismissal of a single minister of government. That party in government, now out of office, seems to view the recent passage of the no-confidence motion as parliamentary kryptonite with the ability, not only to force the dismissal of a single minister but the entire Cabinet and the Executive President as well.
In order to determine what actions should follow from the passage of the no-confidence motion it may be useful to appreciate the following provisions and principles outlined in the Constitution regarding the powers and responsibilities of, and relationship between, the President (and his Cabinet) and Parliament:
1. The supreme organs of democratic power in Guyana are the President, Cabinet and Parliament, which comprises the President and the National Assembly (Articles 50 & 51);
2. There shall be a President of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, who shall be Head of State, the supreme executive authority, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Republic (Article 89);
3. The President shall be elected by the people in the manner prescribed by Article 177 (Article 91);
4. The executive authority of Guyana shall be vested in the President and may be exercised by him/her either directly or through officers subordinate to him/her (Article 99.1) including the Prime Minister, Vice-Presidents and Ministers (Articles 101-103) who shall continue to function up until the date of the next election (Article 104);
5. The President shall, unless his/her office sooner becomes vacant under Article 178, continue in office until the person elected to the Office of President at the next election held under Article 91 assumes office;
6. The President may be removed from office on grounds of physical and/or mental incapacity by the procedure prescribed in Article 179 (Article 93); and for violation of the Constitution or gross misconduct by the procedure prescribed in Article 180 (Article 94);
7. Parliament, for its part, has the ability to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Guyana (Article 65.1) and may alter this Constitution (Article 66);
8. The President may, at any time by proclamation, prorogue (Article 70.1) or dissolve (Article 70.2) Parliament which shall continue for five years unless sooner dissolved (Article 70.3); and
9. Notwithstanding its defeat, the Government shall remain in office and shall hold an election within 3 months or such longer period as the National Assembly shall by resolution supported by not less than two thirds of the votes of all the elected members of the National Assembly determine, and shall resign after the President takes the oath of office following the election (Article 106.6).
The provisions and principles referenced above seem abundantly clear and the CCJ’s consequential orders should recognise that the President, and his Cabinet, shall remain in office, unfettered and undiminished, until the next election and the National Assembly should either vote on a date for the next elections or the President shall, upon the advice of GECOM, proclaim the date for elections.

Sincerely
Oscar Dolphin

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