When is a reputation worth million?

Jul 10, 2026 Features / Columnists, Peeping Tom

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(Kaieteur News) I must confess to being more than a little surprised by the quantum of compensation that has been awarded in some libel cases in Guyana. On more than one occasion, I have found myself asking, “Can a person’s reputation really be injured to the extent that it deserves compensation running into millions of dollars?

That question naturally leads to another. How does a court determine how much of a person’s reputation has actually been damaged? Unlike a broken arm or a damaged vehicle, reputation cannot be measured with a ruler or assessed by a medical examination or by cost of replacement of parts. It is invisible. And people rarely announce that they now think less of someone because of something they have read.

In a small society such as Guyana, how great can be reputational damage when the reach of the offending publication is limited and sometimes very small? How, also does a court decide what is fair compensation when the damage is to something as intangible as one’s good name?

Fortunately, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) addressed these very issues in Glenn Lall v. Walter Ramsahoye. Although the Court ultimately restored the trial judge’s award of G$4.5 million, its real contribution lies in explaining the legal principles that govern compensation for reputational injury.

The Court began with an important proposition. The purpose of damages in a libel case is not to punish the newspaper or publisher. The objective is to compensate the victim for the injury to his reputation and feelings while publicly vindicating his good name.

In determining reputational injury, the CCJ explained that courts examine several factors. They consider the seriousness of the allegations. Were they merely insulting, or did they accuse someone of dishonesty, corruption or professional incompetence?

In that case, the Court also observed what was not proved. There was no evidence that Dr. Ramsahoye had lost patients. There was no evidence of financial loss. There was no psychiatric evidence that he had suffered serious psychological injury. Nor was there evidence that his professional standing had actually declined after the publications.

That distinction is important. Where a claimant seeks larger compensation based upon actual financial or professional loss, those losses must ordinarily be proved.
Another factor considered by the Court was the conduct of the defendants. A prompt apology can substantially reduce the harm. Conversely, persisting with an indefensible publication, refusing to apologise and prolonging litigation may aggravate the injury because the defamatory allegations remain alive in the public mind.

Equally significant was what the Court said about Guyana itself. The Court rejected the suggestion that Guyanese courts should simply follow the much larger libel awards made in Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago. Reputation is local. So too is compensation.

The extent of reputational harm depends upon the community in which the publication occurs. Damages must therefore reflect local conditions, local standards and the economic realities of the country in which the claimant’s reputation exists. A society’s socio-economic circumstances are therefore legitimate considerations when courts assess compensation.

It is important to note also that the publication of something false about a person does not, without more, amount to libel. The common law has never treated every falsehood as defamatory.

Also, a person being libeled does not does not mean every wounded reputation is worth millions. Nor does it mean that courts should attempt to place a market value on a person’s character. Rather, judges are required to exercise careful judgment, weighing the seriousness of the allegation, the standing of the claimant, the extent of publication, the evidence of actual harm, the conduct of the defendant and the economic circumstances of the jurisdiction.

The law therefore approaches reputation with both respect and restraint. It recognises that compensation must remain fair, measured and proportionate. That balance, more than the size of any award, is the enduring lesson from the CCJ’s decision.

If the law is to remain both fair and credible, there must be some principled basis for moving from presumed injury to extraordinary compensation. Where there is no evidence that a person has lost employment, clients, business opportunities, professional standing or suffered demonstrable psychological harm, it is legitimate to ask whether the magnitude of the award truly reflects the extent of the injury or merely the outrage generated by the publication.

That is precisely why the CCJ insisted that damages must be compensatory rather than punitive and that appellate courts should not simply substitute larger figures because they believe a claimant deserves more. The Court recognised that reputation is priceless in one sense, but compensation cannot be price-less.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of this newspaper.

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• CCJ, Glenn Lall v. Walter Ramsahoye, libel cases, millions, reputation

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