Caricom’s quiet shift

May 27, 2026 News

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(Trinidad Express) The recent public confrontation between Trinidad and Tobago and CARICOM over the reappointment of Secretary-General Dr. Carla Barnett has brought into the open deeper questions about the future direction of regional integration.

Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar’s declaration that Trinidad and Tobago will not recognise Dr. Barnett beyond the expiration of her current term—and her assertion that CARICOM is free to “expel us if you want”—has intensified a debate that extends well beyond the immediate dispute itself.

What may appear at first glance to be a dispute over governance may, in reality, represent one of the clearest signs yet that CARICOM is entering a different phase—one defined less by quiet consensus and more by increasingly assertive national positioning.

For decades, the strength of CARICOM rested not only on formal agreements, but on an unwritten understanding: that member states would exercise restraint and manage disagreements within a framework designed to preserve institutional stability and regional cohesion.

That model now appears to be under strain.

To understand what is changing, it is useful to reflect on what CARICOM represented at its best. For Trinidad and Tobago, regional engagement was never simply an act of solidarity—it was a strategy. Leaders such as Eric Williams and Patrick Manning understood that a small country, even one rich in natural resources, could not rely on its domestic market alone to sustain industrial growth.

The development of manufacturing and energy-based industries required markets beyond our shores. CARICOM provided that space—not just as a trade arrangement, but as an economic ecosystem.

Through mechanisms such as the Caribbean Development Fund, Trinidad and Tobago played a leading role in supporting smaller regional economies. This was not charity. It was recognition that stronger neighbouring economies would sustain demand for our goods, support employment, reduce instability and strengthen the region as a whole.

Strong neighbours were good economics.

CARICOM also provided something less visible but equally important: familiarity. Language, legal systems and institutional norms were sufficiently aligned to make regional business feasible, even where markets were small.

This point is often overlooked in current discussions.

There is a growing assumption that markets beyond the Caribbean—whether in Latin America or elsewhere—can easily substitute for regional engagement. That assumption deserves careful examination.

In my own professional experience helping to drive Republic Bank’s expansion strategy, the challenges of entering Spanish-speaking markets were real and material. Geographic proximity did not necessarily translate into ease of entry. In contrast, expansion into markets such as Ghana—despite the distance—benefited from shared language, similar legal traditions and institutional familiarity.

The lesson is simple: market access is not determined by geography alone. It is shaped by structures and relationships that significantly influence outcomes.

This is why CARICOM mattered—and continues to matter.

What now appears to be emerging, however, is a more transactional approach to regional engagement, one increasingly focused on immediate contribution and return.

Questions such as “what are we paying?” and “what are we getting in return?” are not unreasonable. Governments must account for their decisions, particularly during periods of fiscal pressure.

But there is danger in reducing complex strategic relationships to narrow calculations.

Regional institutions depend not only on treaties and rules, but on trust, restraint and a shared commitment to collective outcomes. If those foundations weaken, the institutions themselves inevitably become more fragile.

This is where the real concern lies.

Because what is potentially changing is not simply tone, but philosophy.

If CARICOM becomes primarily a platform for transactional negotiation rather than shared strategic purpose, the implications will be significant. Smaller economies may become more vulnerable. Regional decision-making may become more fragmented. And the collective ability of Caribbean states to influence global outcomes may diminish.

For Trinidad and Tobago, the implications are ­particularly important. The regional framework was never merely an external arrangement—it formed part of our own long-term ­economic strategy.

What we risk weakening is not simply a regional institution, but a carefully constructed economic space that has served us well.

That does not mean change should be resisted. National interests must be asserted, and regional institutions must evolve with changing global realities.

But adaptation must be guided by understanding.

The danger is not disagreement itself—healthy regional institutions must accommodate disagreement—but the gradual erosion of the culture of trust and strategic patience upon which regional integration was built

Because not all value can be captured in immediate returns. Some of it lies in relationships, systems and the quiet alignment that allows small states to act with greater strength than they would otherwise possess

Those things are not easily rebuilt once lost.

• Robert Le Hunte is a former executive director of Republic Bank Ltd and former managing director of ANSA Bank Ltd. He is currently engaged in financial and policy-related consultancy across the Caribbean and Africa.

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• Robert Le Hunte

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