Are the Mohameds properly described as “fugitive offenders”?

Dec 18, 2025 Features / Columnists, Peeping Tom

---

(Kaieteur News) – There has been an exchange of letters, in the Stabroek News, between Surujdai Juglall and the Attorney General of Guyana, Anil Nandlall SC. These letters raise a question that is both legally technical and politically charged: whether it is justifiable to describe either of the Mohameds— Azruddin and his father Nazar – both of whom are resident in Guyana but indicted in the United States and currently the subject of extradition proceedings, as “fugitive offenders.”

At the outset, it is important to separate legal classification from ordinary language usage. Much of the apparent disagreement between the correspondents stems from this distinction. Juglall’s letter proceeds from a conventional and intuitive understanding of the term “fugitive.” In ordinary legal and lay discourse, a fugitive is commonly understood to be someone who flees from justice, evades arrest, or absconds from the jurisdiction of a court. On this understanding, Juglall argues that a person who remains openly within Guyana, is before the courts, has been granted bail, and is actively participating in extradition proceedings cannot logically or legally be described as a fugitive.

This position is not without force. In many common-law contexts, including bail jurisprudence and criminal procedure, “fugitive” status is associated with conduct such as escaping custody, failing to appear, or deliberately concealing oneself. Juglall also invokes broader constitutional principles—particularly the presumption of innocence and the procedural nature of extradition proceedings—to argue that the label risks implying guilt and prejudging matters that are sub judice.

From this perspective, Juglall’s objection is less about statutory interpretation and more about constitutional restraint, political propriety, and the potential prejudicial impact of language. The Attorney General responds by anchoring his position firmly in statute. He relies explicitly on the Fugitive Offenders Act, Cap. 10:04, and in particular on section 2, which defines a fugitive offender as: “a person who is accused … of an extraditable offence … and is or is suspected to be in any country or territory, other than the country or territory in which the offence was committed.”

On a purely textual reading, the Attorney General’s argument is legally correct. The statutory definition does not require flight, evasion, resistance to arrest, or breach of bail. It is sufficient that the person is accused of an extraditable offence, and the person is present in a jurisdiction other than that in which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

Given that the Mohameds are indicted in the United States, reside in Guyana, and are the subject of an extradition request, they fall squarely within the statutory language. In this narrow, technical sense, the description “fugitive offender” is not a rhetorical invention by the Attorney General but a term of art used by the governing legislation.

The critical point is that both Nandlall and Juglall are correct within their respective frames of reference. Legally speaking, under the Fugitive Offenders Act, it is justifiable to describe the Mohameds as fugitive offenders for the limited purposes of extradition law. The statute deliberately adopts a broad and neutral definition designed to capture persons sought by foreign jurisdictions, regardless of whether they fled, cooperated, or remained openly within the requested state.

However, Juglall’s concern remains valid in a different sense. Outside the confines of the Act, the term “fugitive offender” carries strong pejorative connotations. In political discourse, it commonly suggests deliberate wrongdoing, flight from justice, and moral culpability. When deployed by a senior law officer in a public and political context, the statutory meaning may be lost on the general public, leaving only the stigmatising implication. The fact that extradition proceedings are ongoing further complicates matters. While extradition is procedural and does not determine guilt, public characterisations by the Attorney General risk being perceived as prejudging issues that remain before the courts. This concern is heightened where the individuals involved are political actors or prospective officeholders.

It is arguable that the Attorney General’s public description of one of the Mohameds as a “fugitive offender,” though grounded in the statutory language of the Fugitive Offenders Act, could be found to be prejudicial to the fair hearing of the extradition proceedings or to offend the sub judice principle. Given that extradition proceedings are ongoing and involve the exercise of judicial discretion, a court could take the view that repeated or emphatic use of such language by the State’s chief legal officer blurs the line between neutral legal description and implied condemnation.

While it is unlikely that a court would find the language alone sufficient to vitiate a fair hearing—particularly where judicial officials are presumed to be immune to political rhetoric—it is conceivable that a court could regard the statements as sub judice and inappropriate, and recommend or require their withdrawal in the interests of preserving the appearance, as well as the reality, of judicial fairness. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the Attorney General did not purport to invent a new label or act ultra vires; he relied expressly on existing law. His statement that “it is the law that describes Mr. Mohamed as a fugitive offender” is, strictly speaking, accurate.

(The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of this newspaper.)

---

• Anil Nandlall, extradition, fugitive offenders, Mohameds, Peeping Tom

---