Protecting Religious Harmony

Jun 19, 2025 Features / Columnists, Peeping Tom

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Kaieteur News – In a pluralistic society such as Guyana, where diverse religious beliefs and sensibilities coexist, the law must delicately balance the constitutional right to freedom of expression with the equally important right to religious freedom and societal harmony.

The law must draw a bright line between critique and contempt. In this regard, it is both necessary and justified to preserve, or replace with carefully defined alternatives, offences such as blasphemous libel to ensure that expressions do not descend into incitement of religious hatred or violence.

This balance – between the right to freedom of expression and the right to religious freedom – necessitates the retention of offenses that criminalize vulgar and malicious attacks on religious deities while simultaneously upholding the right to legitimate, rational, and respectful critique of religious doctrines and beliefs. So what constitutes legitimate, rational, and respectful critique of religious doctrines and beliefs?  Acceptable criticism of religion falls within the ambit of academic, theological, philosophical, and journalistic expression, where doctrines are interrogated, beliefs challenged, and interpretations debated.

Such criticism must be expressed in language that is civil, devoid of malice, and aimed at advancing understanding rather than provoking outrage. For example, a scholarly critique of the historical development of a particular religion, or public debate over the role of religion in shaping social policy, constitutes acceptable expression. On the contrary, speech that employs crude, profane, vulgar or degrading epithets against religious figures, deities, or symbols—especially when aimed at inciting contempt or emotional injury among adherents—transgresses the boundary of lawful expression and enters the realm of criminal harm.

These acceptable limits mirror jurisprudence from democratic societies. The European Court of Human Rights, in Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (1994), recognized the legitimacy of states protecting religious peace by curtailing expressions that are “gratuitously offensive” to religious believers. In that case, the Court upheld Austria’s measures, ruling that the protection of religious feelings justified the restrictions on freedom of expression, given the film’s extreme provocation. The decision highlights the tension between artistic freedom and religious sensitivities, granting states a margin of appreciation in such conflicts.

In Guyana, there have been calls for the repeal of what has been described as “archaic” blasphemous libel laws. However, a wholesale repeal without the enactment of replacement legislation that targets incitement to religious hatred and violence would leave a gaping hole in the legal architecture designed to safeguard religious coexistence. It would embolden hate speech disguised as free speech, with little recourse for communities that feel under attack.

The real danger lies not merely in offending sensibilities, but in creating a permissive climate for religious polarization, radicalization, and retaliation. In today’s world, malicious attacks on religious symbols and deities are often amplified on social media platforms. It would appear that, in the absence of incitement to hatred and violence, the only legal redress the charge of blasphemous libel.  The absence of others forms of legal redress leaves aggrieved communities with few avenues of justice.

The United Kingdom has repealed blasphemy laws. But it has not left a legal vacuum. It has replaced it with statutes that criminalize incitement to religious hatred, focusing on protecting individuals and communities from speech that fosters hostility and discrimination. If there is consensus that blasphemous libel is archaic, then Guyana can follow suit. It can repeal blasphemous libel and replace it with legislation that explicitly outlaws incitement to religious hatred and violence.

This brings me to the issue of whether an apology for an unlawful act means that the person should not be charged.  An apology, while laudable, does not erase the offence itself. Under the principles of criminal law, an offence is committed once the prohibited act and requisite intent are established. An apology does not negate the actus reus or the mens rea; it merely serves as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Courts may take the expression of remorse into account when determining penalties, but it does not exonerate the perpetrator.

This principle is essential to uphold the rule of law. If offenders could escape liability simply by offering a post hoc apology, it would undermine deterrence and embolden others to engage in similar conduct, expecting impunity after the fact. Mitigation is not absolution. Those who are therefore calling for the repeal of the offence of blasphemous libel must say what should constitute its replacement to safeguard religious coexistence in a multicultural society. Repealing blasphemous libel without viable legal substitutes would constitute legislative abdication, leaving society vulnerable to the dangerous tides of religious hostility.

(The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of this newspaper.)

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• human rights, libel, Peeping Tom, Pluralistic society, Religious Harmony

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