Disciplined Forces: Beyond Cosmetic “Reform”

Aug 30, 2009 Features / Columnists, Ravi Dev

---

The barefaced and contemptible murder and robbery of Dweive Kant Ramdass perpetrated by members of the GDF, followed by the equally outrageous and despicable robbery committed by members of the Police Force deployed to apprehend the accomplices escaping with the loot has stirred almost unanimous outrage in the Guyanese public.
The groundswell of demands that there must be a clean-up of the Forces has once again reached a crescendo. We sincerely hope that these calls will not peter-out once some cosmetic changes are introduced to fix the latest sore that has been exposed in our Disciplined Forces. We have heard of a tightening of the admission screening process.
Our position has long been that these sores are mere symptoms of a deeper underlying disease in our Forces that has been there from their very formation and will continue to erupt unless radical surgery is undertaken to deal with the source of the problem. Many however believe that the problems with the Forces are of recent vintage.
Reacting to accusations of torture and other allegations of transgressions, an ad by the leader of the AFC, Mr. Raphael Trotman on the day before the Ramdass atrocity broke, claimed, “Within recent times, accusatory fingers of unprofessional conduct have been pointed directly at our Disciplined Forces.” After Ramdass, he claimed that only if, “the GDF returns to its glory days as being the people’s army and not “the people’s enemy” will it be deserving of the public’s trust.
“Accusatory fingers of unprofessional conduct have been pointed directly at our Disciplined Forces” from the moment the first Militia was formed in the 17th century as well as the Police Force in 1839. They, and their successor organisations, were explicitly formed to subjugate a captive population on behalf of a colonial power. This power initially staffed the Police Force with Barbadians because they feared the newly freed slaves. Later when the latter proved generally quiescent, they were recruited to checkmate the indentured East Indians that was defined as the new threat to “order”. This ethnic selectivity in staffing our Disciplined Forces became institutionalised and is the canker eating away at its hearts, because it facilitates the manipulation of the Forces for political ends.
When exactly were the “glory days” of the GDF? Was it when Prime Minister Burnham disbanded the ethnically representative Special Services Unit (SSU) that had been formed by the Governor during the ethnic riots of 1964? Was it when Major Sattaur was bypassed by PM Burnham to head the new “Peoples’ Army” that he formed in 1965? Was it when, in the words of Prof. Ken Danns, “The sons and daughters of party activists or some party activists themselves are rewarded (to staff) the military service”? Was it when PM Burnham declared to the GDF’s Officer Corps: “I do not share… the concept that the army is …loyal to the Government of the day…I expect you to be loyal to this Government. If there is any other Government, it is a matter for you to decide about that…”
Was it when seizure of ballot boxes, killing of unarmed civilian protectors of ballot boxes, seclusion of ballot boxes at Camp Ayanganna in 1973 became Standard Operating Procedures? Was it when they concealed the identity of Gregory Smith and spirited him away in 1980? Or was it when all senior officers had to swear personal fealty to PM Burnham? Was it when, as George Danns reminded us, “the army would engage in tactical manoeuvres along with the police just prior to the passing of an unfavourable bill in Parliament or the airing of another austere budget.”
Then again we had the “kick-down-the-door” banditry (with its, in the words of Elder Kwayana, flavour of genocide) in which many servicemen – ex and serving – were said to participate. “Blackie” London was only one such graduate. In the present, if we give any credence to the Roger Khan claims then we have to accept that we had a serving GDF officer Major David Clarke (in charge of Operation Tourniquet, to quell the East Coast violence in 2002) who dealt in drugs and consorted with the terrorists in Buxton.
ROAR was launched in January 1999 as “Rise, Organise And Rally” Against Crime, after thirty Indians were killed during robberies and kidnappings in the preceding year and the Police Force was seemingly comatose. We issued a detailed plan for the professionalization of our Disciplined Forces. We were dubbed, “racists”. We warned then that unless we acted quickly, the chickens would come home to roost: they have been doing so for the succeeding decade with a vengeance. We have a whole new litany of accusations and another round of silence from another section. It would appear that “extrajudicial” measures were used to trump ethnic selectivity. This is the slippiest and most dangerous of all slopes on which to embark.
ROAR has steadfastly agitated for the Forces to be “professionalised” in terms of funding, training, matériel etc. At what some has defined as “fatal” political risk, we participated in the Rule of Law March and spoke at the Square of the Revolution for such professionalisation. We insist, however, that the professionalisation will only take root when the composition of the Forces reflects the makeup of the country. In such an environment, it will not be as easy for politicians to court the loyalty of their “kith and kin” nor purchase “rogue elements”. We have to completely jettison the old premises.
Most of the members of our Disciplined Forces are honest and decent citizens: they should not be placed in an untenable situation structured by ethnic security dilemmas. All the major parties, including the PPP and PNC have refused to accept this analysis, and we wonder what the position of the AFC is.
I conclude with the advice of the scholar Cynthia Enloe, who studied Guyana first hand, and concluded after a worldwide survey in her essay, “Police and Military in the resolution of Ethnic Conflict”. She addressed both dilemmas:
“The resolution of inter-ethnic conflict demands that armies and police forces be examined not as neutral instruments that cope with problems, but as potential causes of the problems as well…Any lasting resolution of ethnic conflict may require that the distribution of political authority and influence in the society be basically reordered and that, as part of that reordering, the police and military be ethnically reconstituted at the top and the bottom.” She is saying, therefore, that we have to address both sources of ethnic insecurities if we are to have lasting peace in Guyana, whether we accept the social facts that undergird them or not.

---

---