CCJ hears arguments on “vitriolic” bias in Mohameds’ extradition case

Apr 22, 2026 News

(Kaieteur News) – The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) yesterday waded into a high-stakes 5-hour legal battle over whether political “vitriol” from government officials can disqualify a Cabinet Minister from initiating extradition proceedings.

At the heart of the matter are Azruddin and Nazar Mohamed, who are wanted in the United States to face federal charges of mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. Their legal team is seeking to quash the Authority to Proceed (ATP) issued by Home Affairs Minister Oneidge Walrond on October 30, 2025, arguing the decision was “infected with bias.”

CCJ hears arguments on “vitriolic” bias in Mohameds’ extradition case

Screengrab of CCJ Proceedings.

The Argument for “First Opportunity” Redress

Defense Counsel Fyard Hosein SC argued that the Fugitive Offenders Act provides a “four-tier” protection system, and the Minister’s role under Section 12 is the critical first gate. “Section 12 is a self-contained section that gives you access for the minister to consider matters such as specialty, double criminality, [and] minimum gravity,” Hosein told the bench. He contended that an accused person is entitled to an unbiased determination at the earliest stage to avoid the “hardship and expense” of a full committal process.

“If it is that the minister who is biased takes that decision… what follows is a number of other processes which would not vindicate your entitlement under section 12 to have that issue determined earlier,” Hosein said.

When pressed by the bench on whether he could point to a specific legal error, such as the Minister ignoring a lack of “double criminality”, Hosein admitted he could not, but maintained that bias itself is a “standing” issue that nullifies the process. “Bias goes to the heart and the soul of the decision-making process and confidence in the administration of law. It is not only the individual rights that have been vindicated, it is the public rights,” Hosein asserted.

The defense’s case rests on the environment surrounding the decision. Hosein claimed that Minister Walrond operated within a “collegial relationship” with the President and Vice President, whom he accused of publicly labeling the Mohameds “criminals, robbers, and thieves.” “This is just not pure political banter,” Hosein argued. “What makes this case different from a normal minister is the extent of the vitriolic statements meeted out against these persons.”

However, the CCJ bench raised questions about the “architecture of the statute.” One Justice noted that in any case involving a political opponent, some level of political advantage is inherent.

“A minister exercising the powers granted by the statute could not by that fact alone be said to be biased such that the minister cannot exercise those functions,” the Justice remarked.

Representing the Minister of Home Affairs Oneidge Walrond, Senior Counsel, Douglas Mendes argued that the Mohameds had essentially waived their right to challenge the Minister’s authority on bias, having engaged in correspondence with her office while knowing the extradition was “in the works.” Mendes further contended that because extradition involves “high political elements,” a member of the Executive must be involved. He suggested that if bias were an issue, the remedy would be for the President to temporarily reassign the portfolio, rather than stripping the Executive of its power. “The substantive issues of legality will be addressed at the judicial phase,” Mendes said, arguing that even if bias were established, the court system remains the ultimate safeguard.

Attorney General Anil Nandlall took a firmer stance, arguing that the issuance of an ATP is a “gateway function” that is purely administrative and does not attract the “full rigor” of natural justice. “There can be situations… where an administrator can act clearly, but natural justice is not required or employed in the performance of that particular function,” Nandlall stated. Justice Arif Bulkan immediately challenged this, indicating he would require legal authorities to support the claim that fair trial principles do not apply to extradition proceedings in light of constitutional rights to a fair hearing.

Nandlall faced a flurry of questions from the bench, specifically regarding whether the standard for a judge (the Porter v Magill test) should apply to a politician acting in a “diplomatic” or “policy” capacity.

Justice Peter Jamadar highlighted an apparent split in the government’s defense. While Douglas Mendes SC had suggested that the Porter v Magill test, which asks whether a “fair-minded and informed observer” would conclude there was a real possibility of bias, was “inapt” for this case, the Attorney General initially appeared to embrace it. Justice Jamadar pressed the AG to clarify if he was abandoning the “open mind” standard in favor of the more rigorous judicial test. “A politician can be biased and still act fairly,” Nandlall countered. “The test is: Did the minister act fairly? Did she follow the statutory guidelines? Was she influenced by something irrelevant?”

Nandlall argued that in the context of an executive act, the only “disqualifying factors” that should trigger a court’s intervention are personal or financial (pecuniary) interests. He maintained that because the Authority to Proceed (ATP) is a “gateway function,” it does not attract the full rigor of natural justice applied in a courtroom. The bench, however, seemed focused on whether the “political mandate” of a minister fundamentally “taints” the process. Justice Jamadar noted that the core of the applicants’ argument is that the alleged bias was so pervasive it poisoned the decision regardless of whether the Minister followed the rules on paper.

Justice Eboe-Osuji questioned why a version of the “fair-minded observer” test couldn’t be adapted to the political context, where the observer would simply be informed of the “circumstances” (the political environment) and then ask if the decision was still valid.

The discussion turned to the previous ruling by the Guyana Court of Appeal. Justice Eboe-Osuji observed that the lower court had used a two-step logic, the test for bias is not engaged at all because issuing an ATP is a ministerial function, not a judicial one and even if the test were engaged, the facts of the Mohamed case would not meet the Porter v Magill standard for a finding of bias. Attorney General Nandlall confirmed that the state has adopted this “dual-layered” position. He insisted that while the court has supervisory jurisdiction, it must respect the “policy nature” of the decision.

While the Attorney General argued that “political influence” does not equate to “legal unfairness,” the CCJ bench signaled that it must now define exactly what “fairness” looks like when the decision-maker is a political actor. “We have to write a judgment… and we have to try and understand what the law is before we apply it,” Justice Jamadar remarked.

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Azruddin, Bias, CCJ, extradition, Mohameds

One thought on “CCJ hears arguments on “vitriolic” bias in Mohameds’ extradition case”

habeeb April 22, 2026 at 12:16 pm

A Magician he is not, despite his “hand gestures” before the CCJ.
His public comments has doomed this case, against the Mohameds.

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