No contradiction or conflict 

Nov 24, 2025 Features / Columnists, Peeping Tom

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(Kaieteur News) – A tempest in a teapot is brewing. Politicians, including the President of Guyana, are suggesting a fundamental clash between the decisions of two High Court judges over the powers of the Guyana Revenue Authority (GRA).

The recent decision of Justice Roxane George and that of Justice Gino Persaud are being portrayed as being in contradiction to each other. This perception is not only exaggerated but is fundamentally incorrect. A dispassionate examination of the facts reveals no major conflict; instead, we see two different judges applying the law to two very different sets of facts. The public excitement is, quite simply, over nothing.

The core of the matter lies in a straightforward legal principle: statutes have clear boundaries, and the same law can produce different outcomes when applied to different scenarios. The relevant statute here is the Customs Act, and the critical boundary is a three-year time limit. Let’s first consider the case before Justice George. An importer, Zhangzhen Yu, brought in goods, paid duties, and received clearance. Subsequently, but within the three-year period stipulated by law, the GRA’s Post Clearance Audit Unit (PCAU) invoked its powers under Section 233 of the Customs Act.

This section is used, whether rightly or wrongly, as the linchpin of post-clearance auditing. In this regard, it gives the GRA three years from the date of import to request documents—invoices, bills, accounts—to verify the accuracy of a declaration. In the Yu case, the GRA made this request within the legal window. The importer failed to provide the documentation. As a result, the GRA revalued the goods and issued a demand for the extra duty. The importer challenged this decision.

Justice George’s ruling affirmed the lawfulness of this process. She pointed to Section 233 as the source of the GRA’s power to investigate and to Section 17(2) as the mechanism to collect any short-levied duties discovered. Her judgment was a straightforward affirmation of the GRA’s civil and administrative powers, exercised within the statutory time limit. The PCAU was found to be a lawful part of the GRA, and the reassessment was justified given the facts available to the court. This was a textbook application of the law as it is written.

Justice George’s broad interpretation of Section 17(2) is likely to be challenged in higher courts at some time or the other. But even assuming a broad interpretation, this does not place her judgement at odds with the earlier judgement by Justice Persaud. Also, Section 79(1)(e) provides that before delivery can be effected the goods must first be entered. Entering the goods is therefore a precondition, under the existing law, for taking delivery. Any contention therefore that the goods were not entered is therefore likely to be challenged in a higher court.

Now, let’s turn to the case before Justice Gino Persaud involving Azruddin Mohamed. On the surface, it seems similar: an importer (of a vehicle), cleared goods, and was later faced with a demand for extra duties. However, the devil is in the detail—a critical detail the public discourse is ignoring. The GRA made its demand after the three-year window provided for in Section 233 had closed. This changes everything. Section 233 creates a clear window for the tax authority to commence investigations. It also provides finality for traders and importers, meaning that after three years, their declarations are considered final and cannot be challenged under this specific civil, administrative section.

Once that window closes, the GRA cannot simply send a letter demanding documents for a routine audit. The importer is within their rights to refuse. Therefore, Justice Persaud’s ruling that the GRA could not recoup the duties through an arbitrary assessment is perfectly consistent with the law. The contention that GRA can only do so through an offence-related mechanism is not a contradiction of Justice George. It is the logical next step when the administrative path has expired or did not apply. The civil window was closed, so the GRA would have to allege and prove a criminal offence—such as fraud—which typically has a longer limitation period, often seven years. This does not contradict Justice George’s ruling in the slightest. If the GRA in the Yu case had waited beyond three years to demand documents, it too would have lost its administrative power to reassess.

In my view, the seeming “conflict” between the judges evaporates when you realise they were answering different questions. Justice George was asked: “Is the PCAU acting lawfully when it conducts a reassessment within three years?” She answered correctly, “Yes.” Justice Persaud was asked: “Can the GRA lawfully seize property and demand duties for a transaction through a post clearance assessment done after the statutory limitation window has closed, without tying it to a specific offence?” He answered, correctly, “No.”

The real scandal here is not a conflict between judges, but the GRA’s apparent failure to manage its own statutory deadlines in the Mohamed case, and the subsequent mysterious withdrawal of the very charges that would have been the proper, offence-related mechanism to pursue. The judiciary has done its job, applying the law consistently to the facts presented. The public and the politicians should direct their scrutiny away from the courts and toward the administration of the revenue authority itself. The judges are not at odds; the problem lies with an agency that seems to believe its powers are not bound by the clocks and calendars that govern everyone else.

(The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of this newspaper.)

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• conflict, contradiction, Guyana Revenue Authority, Peeping Tom

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