Misguided arguments and constitutional confusion

Nov 08, 2025 Features / Columnists, Peeping Tom

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(Kaieteur News) – In recent days, the public discourse surrounding the extradition proceedings against the Mohameds has been clouded by a fog of misinformation, misinterpretation, and, frankly, mischief. Two arguments in particular have been circulating: one expressing shock that the Mohameds were granted bail during their court appearance, and the other advancing the wholly erroneous contention that the Constitution of Guyana prohibits the granting of bail in extradition cases.

Both positions betray a startling lack of legal understanding. The first reflects an ignorance of how judicial processes operate; the second is not merely wrong; it is preposterous.

It is in fact unbecoming of anyone who has had even rudimentary legal training. The idea that the Constitution of Guyana bars bail in extradition proceedings is not only incorrect. It is a distortion of the plain meaning and intent of our supreme law.

Let us start with the basics. The right to liberty—the right to be free—is a foundation of constitutional democracy. It is enshrined in Article 139 of the Constitution of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, which provides that “no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may be authorized by law.”

This is a fundamental right that flows from the recognition of human dignity and the presumption of innocence. Every citizen and every person within the jurisdiction of Guyana enjoys this right, whether accused of a local offence or facing extradition proceedings initiated by a foreign state.

However, as with all rights, the right to liberty is not absolute. Article 139 itself enumerates the circumstances under which a person may lawfully be deprived of liberty. These include lawful arrest upon reasonable suspicion of having committed, or being about to commit, a criminal offence; detention for the purpose of bringing a person before a court; and detention in execution of a lawful sentence or court order. In other words, the Constitution recognizes that liberty can be curtailed, but only in accordance with law, and subject to judicial oversight.

Extradition proceedings, by their very nature, constitute one of these lawful processes that can affect personal liberty. When an extradition request is made, the individual concerned is brought before a magistrate or judge to determine whether the conditions for extradition are satisfied under Guyana’s Fugitive Offenders Act.

But it is critical to note that this process does not amount to an automatic deprivation of liberty without recourse. The individual facing extradition retains the right to seek bail, and the court retains the discretion to grant it—subject, of course, to considerations such as the risk of flight, the seriousness of the allegations, and the assurance that the person will appear for subsequent hearings.

Those who contend that the Constitution “prohibits” bail in extradition cases have evidently failed to appreciate this distinction. There is simply no such prohibition—neither in the Constitution nor in the law. To claim otherwise is to conjure a legal phantom where none exists. In fact, bail is a safeguard precisely designed to balance the right to liberty with the interests of justice. It is not an indulgence, nor an act of leniency; it is a mechanism that allows the law to operate fairly, ensuring that an accused person is not punished before being found guilty or before the legal process has run its course.

One needs only to look beyond our borders to see that this is standard judicial practice. In Trinidad and Tobago, Jack Warner, the former FIFA Vice-President, faced extradition proceedings at the request of the United States. The Trinidadian courts granted him bail—substantial bail, yes, but bail nonetheless—while the matter proceeded through the judicial system. Warner’s case was far more complex, politically charged, and internationally scrutinized than the present one, yet the principle held firm: a person facing extradition is entitled to apply for and be considered for bail.

What we are witnessing in the case of the Mohameds is no different. The court, exercising its lawful discretion, granted bail pending the determination of the extradition proceedings. That decision aligns perfectly with the Constitution, with established judicial precedent, and with basic principles of fairness and due process. To express surprise or outrage at such a decision is to reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of how our legal system functions.

Indeed, those advancing the view that bail is somehow alien to extradition proceedings—or worse, constitutionally prohibited—should take a moment to revisit the very document they claim to invoke. The Constitution is not a weapon of convenience to be brandished when it suits one’s narrative; it is the supreme law of the land, grounded in logic, legality, and liberty. To twist its meaning to score rhetorical points is irresponsible.

Bail, as our courts have repeatedly emphasized, is a matter of judicial discretion. It is not automatically granted, but neither is it automatically denied. It rests upon the principle that liberty is the norm and detention the exception. Only compelling reasons can justify depriving a person of freedom before guilt has been established or a lawful extradition order made.

Those who advance frivolous or facetious arguments to the contrary do a grave disservice to public understanding and to the rule of law itself. They sow confusion, undermine confidence in the judicial process, and betray the very constitutional values they purport to defend.

(The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of this newspaper.)

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