The Speaker and freedom to speak in the House

Nov 20, 2016 Letters

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Dear Editor,
John.Q.Tilson, a Lecturer in Parliamentary Law at Yale Law School, a former Speaker of Connecticut House of Representatives and a former Majority Leader of the US House of Representatives in his text, A manual of Parliamentary Procedure, (1948), describing the personage of one who presides over a Parliament, wrote thus: “The presiding officer of a parliamentary assembly is an institution growing out of human efforts directed toward self-government and is typical of a democratic republic. The person exercising this function is usually chosen from the ranks of the membership and by the suffrage of the body over which he is to preside. He is clothed with certain important powers of the office, yet he is at all times the servant of the body and subject to its control.”
Across the Atlantic, treating with the British tradition, the authors of, Erskine May Parliamentary Practice (20thEd), expressed similar sentiments about the office of the Speaker of the House of Commons. At page 234 they stated: “The chief characteristic attaching to the office of Speaker in the House of Commons are authority and impartiality …Confidence in the impartiality of the Speaker is an indispensable condition of the successful working of procedure, and many conventions exists which have their object not only to ensure the impartiality of the Speaker but also to ensure that his impartiality is generally recognized.”
In recent times, the conduct of the Speaker of the National Assembly has titillated great public interest and excited grave concerns. We, in the Opposition, have been forced to publicly question the Chair’s impartiality on a number of occasions. The November 4th (2016) sitting of the National Assembly is as good as any to examine the Speaker’s conduct and rulings. I will only address what transpired during my presentation. What occurred at that sitting during my presentation is now public knowledge, and thus, there is no need for me to recite all of the facts. Suffice it to say that, I was interrupted no less than four times by the Speaker, who ruled that I cannot mention certain matters because of the existence of legal proceedings; the Speaker then prohibited me from speaking altogether because I could not instantly produce a newspaper to which I made reference during my speech; the Speaker next prohibited me from participating in the remainder of the proceedings of the House and eventually, the Speaker ordered me to leave the House.
I will examine two of these rulings. I do so with the singular hope that it will inure to strengthen our fledgling parliamentary democracy, since, I harbor no doubt that the facts which precipitated those rulings are bound to re-occur in the very near future. Before I embark on a discourse upon these rulings, I feel compelled to offer some brief remarks on the right of a Member to speak in the National Assembly.
In a constitutional democracy like ours, there is no other forum that offers a greater guarantee to free speech than in the National Assembly. Unlike the United Kingdom, the right to free speech in our Parliament has but a profound constitutional underpinning, which is inextricably bound to the very quintessence of representative democracy. The principle was elaborately addressed by Chief Justice Chang in a case filed by me, as Attorney- General, on the 27th of November, 2012, when the Joint-Opposition gagged then Minister of Home Affairs, the Honourable Clement Rohee, from speaking in the National Assembly. In the course of his 34 pages Judgment, Chief Justice Chang at page 27 posited: “… It is the view of this court that Mr. Rohee’s right to speak in the National Assembly derives from his office as member of the National Assembly and not from his office as an Executive Minister. Thus, his right as an elected member of the National Assembly must be concomitant with his constitutional duty to speak for and to represent his electors in the National Assembly who, in turn, have a concomitant right to be so represented. It is here apposite to note that article 9 of the Constitution expressly provides: “sovereignty belongs to the people who exercise it through their elected representatives.”
Free speech is regarded as so sacrosanct and integral to the business of Parliament that members enjoy immunity from suit for anything said or done in the House. The rationale is obvious. Members, in canvassing the welfare of those whom they represent must be able to do so robustly, candidly and free from fear of legal proceedings regarding what they say or do in the House. In Guyana, this immunity is codified by the supreme law of the land. Article 172(2) of the Constitution provides that, no civil or criminal proceedings may be instituted against any member of the Assembly for words spoken before, or written in a report to, the Assembly, or to a committee thereof.
In short, the highest law of this land guarantees unqualified free speech in the Assembly. Of course, there are certain restrictions which are imposed by the Standing Orders. However, I must emphasize that these Standing orders are to regulate speeches in the National Assembly; not to curtail them. They must be interpreted liberally and in a manner that will encourage and engender free speech; not restrict or frustrate it. Any restrictive interpretation of these Standing Orders will run afoul of the very nature of Parliament.
Mohabir Anil Nandlall

Editor’s note: because of its volume, we will have to conclude this letter in our edition tomorrow.

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