Guyana’s opposition faces mounting challenges

Aug 10, 2026 Letters

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Dear Editor,

Two independent voices: one international, one from inside Guyana’s election machinery have converged on the same warning: the institutions meant to guarantee a free and fair vote aren’t yet trustworthy enough to go unwatched. That should be the starting point for any discussion of the 2030 election.

The Carter Center’s assessment of the 1st September, 2025 election was blunt: widespread complaints cited unregulated campaign finance and misused state resources, with incumbency advantages disguised as public works undermining the poll’s fairness. Journalists reported state-driven censorship and intimidation, and evidence showed candidates obstructed from campaigning freely — structural findings from one of the world’s most respected observer bodies.

That external verdict is now echoed internally. GECOM Commissioner Alexander has accused the commission’s chair of serious impartiality breaches, arguing the chair’s obstruction and overreach make free and fair elections impossible — conduct allegedly amounting to “misbehaviour,” which the commissioner argues is a precondition for removal under Article 225.

Together, these external and internal accounts describe the same institutional weakness from opposite vantage points, a convergence hard to dismiss as partisan noise. It’s the backdrop against which opposition fragmentation must be judged: a serious problem against an ordinary incumbent, far graver against one credibly accused of tilting the referee.

Comparable case law:
· Kenya — Raila Odinga v. IEBC (2017): Supreme Court nullified the presidential election, citing systemic irregularities that echoed concerns raised by international observer missions.

· Malawi — Chilima & Chakwera v. Mutharika (2019–2020): Constitutional ourt annulled the presidential election over irregularities corroborated by domestic and international observers; upheld on appeal.

· Zimbabwe — Chamisa v. Mnangagwa (2018): Petition drew on EU and Commonwealth observer criticism of the process, though the Constitutional Court ultimately upheld the result.

Note: these are illustrative parallels on how observer-mission and internal-body findings have featured in past election disputes elsewhere — not a legal opinion on Guyana’s situation. I’m not a legal practitioner practising in Guyana.

The opposition remains split 3 ways, and the math has worsened. In 2020, the combined opposition held 32 seats — 1 short of a majority. In 2025, that fell to 29 — 4 short. Oil wealth has also split the mainland from a hinterland still awaiting its share, a frustration itself fractured among WIN, APNU, and FGM. Meanwhile the government converts incumbency into votes in real time; a land-titling push alone may move roughly 35,000 ballots.

The Stabroek clock, at least, is fixed. Article 70(3) requires Parliament to dissolve 5 years after the Assembly first sits. The 13th Parliament convened 3rd November, 2025. Barring a declared war under Article 70(4), the outer deadline is 3rd November, 2030, with polling likely within 2 months after. That date won’t move; everything else remains an open question.
Guyana’s economy is booming (oil money), but there aren’t enough local workers to keep up — so people are pouring in from other countries. The head of the UN’s migration agency (IOM) came to talk about this, calling it a natural part of Guyana growing up as a country.

The numbers show how big this is: about 5,000 Cubans are working construction jobs in the capital, Georgetown. Meanwhile, way more Cubans are passing through Lethem on their way to Brazil — that traffic almost tripled in a year (2,100 up to 6,400). On top of that, thousands more Venezuelans have arrived too, adding to thousands already there.

Both Cuban and Venezuelan migrants run into the same wall — their visas are short and hard to renew, so many end up working off-the-books and living in unstable housing, with no real legal status.

Colombia handled a similar wave of Venezuelan migrants better — it gave over a million of them 10-year permits to live and work legally. Guyana doesn’t have anything like that yet. There’s an international fundraising appeal to help Guyana handle this, but it’s only about 15% funded — meaning Guyana mostly has to deal with this on its own, and can’t count on outside money to bail it out.

The fix suggested: create a proper system to register migrants, fast-track their job credentials, and let their kids go to school regardless of status.

This brings me to a broader argument: none of these problems — migration, unequal oil wealth, labour shortages — get solved unless the government is actually held accountable, and unless the political opposition unites before the election, not scrambling at the last minute.

I suggest my position can be bolstered with examples from other countries: in Chile, Zambia, and the Gambia, opposition parties that teamed up early (years in advance, picking 1 leader together) actually won and governed well. Chile’s Concertación united 17 parties 2 years ahead of its election and governed for 2 decades. Zambia’s Hichilema lost 5 elections before sustained coalition-building finally won. The Gambia unseated a 22-year incumbent after 7 opposition parties settled early on 1 candidate. Same lesson from coalition deals in the UK, Pakistan, and India. The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition agreement was a policy document drawn up following the UK’s 2010 general election. But in Guyana when unity gets thrown together last-minute, Guyanese voters can smell that it’s just a political tactic, not a genuine alliance — which is basically what happened to Guyana’s AFC party in 2025, when their late attempt at teaming up won them zero seats.

History is consistent: unity negotiated early works; unity improvised late doesn’t. 3rd November, 2030 will not wait for anyone’s ego to soften.

Regards,
Mohamed Shabeer Zafar

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• 2030 election, Carter Center, GECOM Commissioner, Guyana, opposition

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