When extradition becomes political: The Mohameds’ constitutional challenge and what it means for Guyana

Dec 28, 2025 Letters

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Dear Editor, 

The Mohameds’ move to the High Court is not just another tactical step in a high-profile extradition fight; rather, it’s a direct challenge to how Guyana balances executive power, judicial independence, and public confidence when an extradition request collides with electoral politics.

At the center of the current dispute is the Authority to Proceed (ATP), the legal trigger that allows committal proceedings to begin in the magistrates’ court. The Mohameds, Azruddin and his father, Nazar, are asking the High Court to quash the ATP issued by Home Affairs Minister Oneidge Walrond, arguing that it is invalid because of alleged bias and the broader political climate surrounding their case.

The “bias” argument is really about legitimacy. In their court filings (as reported), the Mohameds contend that public statements by senior state officials created (in their view) an atmosphere of hostility that disqualifies key decision-makers from initiating the extradition process. They argue this undermines the presumption of innocence and prejudices their right to a fair process, and that the ATP (and by extension the arrest warrants based on it) should be treated as a nullity.

Whether the courts ultimately agree is one thing. But politically, the point is bigger: extradition can’t be seen as a partisan instrument, especially when the person sought is not merely “a private citizen,” but the leader of a major political bloc.

Azruddin Mohamed’s party, We Invest in Nationhood (WIN), emerged as a dominant opposition force after the September 1, 2025 elections, winning 16 of 65 seats according to international reporting. That context matters because every legal decision now carries an unavoidable political shadow: supporters will interpret actions as either “rule of law” or “political removal,” depending on their loyalties.

The constitutional challenge goes deeper than personalities. The more consequential layer is the Mohameds’ constitutional attack on parts of the Fugitive Offenders framework itself, particularly amendments associated with Act No. 30 of 2009, which their lawyers argue offend separation of powers, the rule of law, judicial independence, and liberty/due process protections.

Why would a 2009 amendment become explosive now? Because extradition law is where executive discretion meets judicial gatekeeping. And the 2009 provisions they’re targeting can be read, fairly or unfairly, as the law trying to “smooth out” treaty gaps by directing how courts should interpret missing provisions, while limiting the ability of the person sought to challenge those gaps.

The state’s likely counter-story is that extradition is a “hybrid” process, not a criminal trial. The prosecution side has already pushed a broader thesis in related proceedings: that many constitutional “fair trial” arguments don’t bite at the extradition stage because extradition is not the criminal trial itself, it’s a preliminary mechanism grounded in treaty relations and executive-judicial cooperation.

Politically, that argument has appeal because it frames the state as simply complying with international obligations. But it also has a risk: it can sound like “constitutional rights don’t apply here,” which is exactly the kind of messaging that fuels public distrust in sensitive cases.
The timing is the political pressure point. The High Court reportedly fixed January 6, 2026 to hear the constitutional issues, while committal proceedings were also scheduled to begin around the same period, creating a collision of timetables that amplifies national attention and partisan interpretation. This is where institutional design matters. If the public sees the judiciary as being forced to “race the clock” against an already-activated executive process, confidence can erode, even if every step is technically lawful. The court system must not only be independent; it must be seen to be independent.

The 2024 amendments sharpen the context. Separate from the 2009 provisions, Guyana also amended the Fugitive Offenders Act in 2024 to broaden what evidence can be admitted in extradition matters, changes presented publicly as strengthening cooperation and efficiency in extradition proceedings. Reformers will argue: transnational crime is real; extradition must work; loopholes can’t make Guyana a safe harbor. Critics will respond in a politically charged case, “streamlining” can look like “lowering safeguards.” The Mohameds’ legal strategy taps directly into that tension, whether or not their claims succeed.

My read: the court outcome will matter less than the institutional lesson. No matter where you stand on the Mohameds personally or on the U.S. case that prompted the extradition request, the democratic test here is straightforward:
1. Are executive officials exercising restraint in public commentary on active legal matters?
2. Is the initiation of extradition insulated from partisan incentives (or at least structured to reduce the perception of partisan incentives)?
3. Can the judiciary review and correct executive overreach without being accused, credibly, of political alignment?

If Guyana gets those three right, the system survives this storm stronger. If not, the damage will outlive the case. Because once extradition becomes widely believed to be a tool of political management, fairly or unfairly, every future extradition request becomes harder, slower, and more divisive. And in an era where Guyana’s global profile (and external scrutiny) is only rising, that is a cost the country can’t afford.

Rajendra Lachman (Political Analyst)

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• Azruddin, extradition, Letters, political

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