Maduro’s existential threat continues

Jan 12, 2025 Letters

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Dear Editor,

It was not by accident that three days before his scheduled Jan 10^th inauguration, Maduro announced he was scheduling the election of the governor of Essequibo.  His referendum of Dec 2, 2023 had approved its “annexation” and on 21 March 2024 his National Assembly had unanimously created the state of “Guayana Esequiba”, to be run by a Maduro-appointed authority until the election of its governor. Knowing his inauguration would precipitate internal and external protests because of its illegitimacy, he again hoped to raise patriotic emotions over the Essequibo in the citizenry and the critical military forces, targeted by the opposition.

But the Jan 9^th opposition protests was not as successful as expected; perhaps influenced by the Essequibo dog whistle but primarily because of Maduro’s mobilisation of the “organs of integral direction” (ODIS). This structure centralises political power, the Armed Forces, the Bolivarian National Militia, police forces and community groups, to “maintain order” but actually to subdue the population and stifle any expression of dissent. Maduro also organized counter protests and was duly sworn in by his ally, National Assembly leader Jorge Rodríguez.

Edmundo González, the opposition leader stand-in for the charismatic Maria Machado who had been banned from running in last July 28 elections, had been declared as the “president elect” by the US in view of their voting machines’ tally-sheets showing he had won the elections. Machado’s Electoral Council never released theirs as had been done in previous elections. Gonzalez had been received by President Biden and had promised to show up in Venezuela to be inaugurated, but this never happened. Machado did lead some protests inside Venezuela and was briefly detained after one.

Directly after the inauguration, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated US support of Gonzalez and announced an upping of the bounty on Maduro’s and Minister of Interior Diosdado Cabello’s heads from US$15M to US$25M, on drug trafficking charges. They offered a US$15 million reward for Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López and sanctions on “eight Maduro-aligned individuals…including members of the security forces and political figures” bringing these up to 187 persons. Similar actions were taken today by Canada, the EU, and the UK as in 2019 for Juan Guaido, which were then of no avail. Most notably, however, the Blinken administration left untouched the licence allowing Chevron to extract and ship Venezuelan heavy crude to the US, which would have been the only action materially adversely impacting the Maduro administration.

With Trump’s inauguration on January 20, it is expected that with the fierce anti-Maduro Marco Rubio leading the State Department, and Rep Mike Waltz as his National Security Advisor, it is hard to imagine Washington taking a softer stance toward Maduro. Waltz had sponsored the ironically named bipartisan BOLIVAR Act – Banning Operations and Leases with Illegitimate Venezuelan Authoritarian Regime – approved by the house and now before the Senate.  Trump signalled his position when he announced his support for Machado and “President-elect” Gonzalez as the protests unfolded in Venezuela.

However, Trump himself is apparently facing pressure from oil execs to maintain Biden’s policy of granting concessions to Maduro, via licences, to secure oil imports from Venezuela. This will be the litmus test of even matching his failed 2019 pro Guaido strategy. There is also the question of Venezuelan migrants, which Trump is committed to returning to Venezuela and for which he will need a quid pro quo from Maduro.

All of this now brings us to what should be our response to a third-term Maduro. The day after Maduro’s announcement on a governor of Essequibo, the government expressed “grave concern over Venezuela once again violating the Argyle Agreement and the Dec 1, 2023 order of the ICJ.” This is water on duck’s back. We must recognise the realities of the situation: it is quite unlikely that even Trump will move beyond sanctions at best as he focuses on China, the Mid East, Russia, Greenland, Canada and Mexico.

Our Essequibo will remain a low-hanging fruit for Maduro, and even for any possible successor from the opposition. Our only recourse is to continue strategically augmenting our physical and manpower capabilities: while we may not be able to defeat Venezuela’s far larger military on our own, at a minimum we can make them think twice by waging the type of asymmetric warfare we have seen deployed with success in other theatres. We have recommended establishing a military base in northern Essequibo. Brazil protects our southern, Rupununi flank.

Sincerely,

Ravi Dev

(Maduro’s existential threat continues)

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• Brazil protects, Guayana Esequiba, Maduro’s mobilisation, Marco Rubio, National Assembly

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