A penetrating analysis of the functioning of Guyana’s parliamentary system

Aug 30, 2020 APNU Column, Features / Columnists

(A Review of David Granger’s The public trust: Parliamentary democracy in a small state.)
David Granger’s The public trust: Parliamentary democracy in a small state provides a penetrating analysis of the functioning of Guyana’s parliamentary system. The book dissects the fundamental shortcomings of an institution which is supposed to epitomize representative democracy.
The book was written eight years ago when Granger was Leader of the Opposition. A minority government was then in place with the two Opposition groups – A Partnership for National Unity and the Alliance for Change –together holding a one-seat majority in the National Assembly.
Granger wrote this book conscious that the configuration provided an opportunity for greater inclusion but that such inclusion, in the context of the constitutional role of the legislative branch, required improvement in the functioning of the National Assembly.
The public trust: Parliamentary democracy in a small state can become a catalyst for triggering a broader discourse about the need for parliamentary reforms. Its re-publication in 2020 is timely and relevant. The country’s fractious politics has given rise to demands for greater inclusionary democracy. With executive power-sharing now firmly relegated to the political backburner, the role of the National Assembly assumes greater importance in holding governments accountable and in forging greater consensus.
Guyana’s chronic political crisis had spawned strident advocacy for constitutional reform. No less significant, however, is the refashioning of the institutions of representative democracy so that they can make a more meaningful contribution to good governance.
Granger uses the findings of Sir Michael Davies’s report – entitled A Needs Assessment of the Guyana National Assembly– as the starting point for his analysis. Davies was commissioned to provide technical and procedural advice and to undertake a functional review of the Assembly’s Standing Orders, parliamentary committees’ record-keeping, its human resources, administration and material needs.
His report, published in February 2005, identified a number of weaknesses among which was the lack of independence of the Legislative branch from the Executive. Davies called for steps to be taken to ensure the Assembly’s independence, noting that this was necessary if the legislature was to exercise effective scrutiny of the Executive.
Guyana’s National Assembly, like the country’s judicial and public administration systems, has its roots in its British counterpart – the House of Commons. The British, as an imperial power, transplanted its institutions to its colonies. Granger makes an incisive point about this process, however. He notes that the relationship between the Crown and the Legislature was not modelled after the House of Commons. He argues that the system was so constructed as to emasculate both the Governor (of the colony of British Guiana) and the pre-Independence local Legislative Councils, thereby placing effective control in the hands of the British parliament and the Foreign Office (Westminster-Whitehall).
Structurally, therefore, the local legislatures, mirrored the House of Commons but functionally, however, were actually designed to consolidate power externally. Herein may lie the germ which has infected legislatures in post-colonial societies which have retained the Westminster model.
The introduction of universal adult suffrage and, later, political Independence, made local legislatures more representative but these changes did not alter, fundamentally, the adversarial characteristics inherent in the Westminster system. Despite this, the Westminster parliamentary model is considered ideal for the exercise of sovereignty through the passage and repeal of laws and the exercise of oversight of government. Yet, parliamentary oversight is viewed, generally, as weak.
Political analysts have suggested that here are three reasons for this – first, the absence of parliamentary institutions to provide effective oversight; second, the lack of capacity to determine when sanctions should be imposed; and, third, the system’s being hobbled by parties in government reluctant to sanction their Ministers.
Another identifiable defect is the suitability of Westminster parliamentary systems to multi-ethnic societies. Strident criticisms are often made of the majoritarian parliamentary system, the most common of which is that it exacerbates societal divisions.
Constitutional reforms, instituted periodically, have not led to marked improvements in the effectiveness of National Assemblies. Reforms have been promulgated on the basis of making the country’s political system more relevant to its ethnic, ideological and political diversity. Ironically, constitutional reforms have tended to treat parliamentary reforms as internal to National Assemblies.
Constitutional reforms have failed to alter, also, the National Assembly’s adversarial culture. Nor has it diminished the dominant role which the Executive has exercised over the management of the Assembly, as is borne out by the ‘Davies Report’.
The public trust: Parliamentary democracy in a small state makes out a case for change. Granger implies that this change must aim at restoring public trust. He points to a number of areas requiring action–transparency and accountability, strengthening the committee system, translating representative democracy into good governance, the need for more frequent sittings, the expense and time involved in transporting hinterland parliamentarians to Georgetown and, significantly, the suggestion that parliamentarians should be ‘full-time.’
Granger has not offered a menu of measures to redress the Assembly’s shortcomings. He has merely pointed to the need for reforms to improve the functioning and independence of the National Assembly and the vital importance of its regaining public trust.
Granger was elected as President of Guyana in 2015. He set about ensuring greater independence for the National Assembly immediately. His government promulgated the Fiscal Management and Accountability (Amendment) Bill 2015 which allows for greater financial autonomy for constitutional agencies such as the National Assembly. This was an important first step in affording greater independence to the National Assembly. The passage of this legislation was crucial to removing the Executive’s stranglehold on the Legislative branch. It allowed for the National Assembly to determine how it would spend its resources.
The public trust: parliamentary democracy in a small state reveals the yet unfinished business of improving the functioning and administration of the National Assembly. Reports by consultants and advisors often end up gathering dust; their recommendations unimplemented years after. Granger’s book may help resurrect that sturdy body of studies and reports.
Constitutional reform is necessary to improve representative democracy. Granger’s book reminds us that so, too, is parliamentary reform.