Mr. Persaud cannot deliberately disregard his serious ethical responsibility

Feb 17, 2019 Letters

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Dear Editor,

Permit me some space, please, if you may, to offer a brief clarificatory comment on some ONLINE responses to my letter published in the 12th February, 2019, ONLINE EDITION OF THE GUYANA CHRONICLE, and captioned, ‘ THE SPEAKER AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE PREEMINENCE AND PREPONDERANCE OF ARTICLE 156 (3).
To fully appreciate the impacting import of Article 156 (3) on Mr. Charrandass Persaud’s vote [what I call his ‘purporting to vote’], one needs to fully grasp the significance of the implication of Article 160 (1) (a) (b) (c) — but more especially so to 160(2) (a) — on the question of the validity of Mr. Persaud’s act of casting his vote in support of the opposition Party’s motion.
(1) The electors who ensured Mr. Persaud’s Party got 33 seats in the National Assembly casted their votes with the expectation, naturally, that Mr. Persaud would faithfully represent their interests, through the Party for which those electors voted [Article 160].
(2) Mr. Persaud swore to an oath to faithfully perform that obligation to the said provision.
(3) The electors expected that if Mr. Persaud should at any time be impelled to serve the interests of another Party, he would take the necessary steps,, as set out in 156 (3).
(4) Elected Member, Charrandass Persaud, failed to honour the trust placed in him by the electors, and the oath he took to honour the relevant requirements of Article 156.
What, then, is the remedy?
(1) Outside of the Constitution, the Supreme Law, there are ethical laws, including Principles of Equity, which constrain one from benefitting from his own wrongdoing to the person from whom he/she would have gained the benefit.
(2) Apart from that, Mr. Persaud cannot deliberately disregard, out of hand, with impunity, his serious ethical responsibility and solemn promise / commitment, his failure to honour, which has redounded to the mortal detriment to his promisees’s interests. His benefit from his unclean hand should not, indeed, cannot, stand. The Law will not allow itself be made such an ass of [sounds far better, indeed, than ‘of which to be made such an ass’, as per Winston Churchill’s famous contribution to the advancement of the English Language].
(3) In other words, he had either determined to deceive the electorate and the Party on whose list he had allowed his name to be placed, or else, at some later time, he had premeditated to totally disregard the clear, plain, easily understood, entrenchment procedural implicity of Article 156– ignorance of which, was, of course, no excuse at all, nor could such ignorance, in the circumstances, be pleaded or easily or justifiably claimed. It was Henry De Vere Stacpoole, way back in 1918, in chapter 29 of his The Man Who Lost Himself:, said, ” I’m not one of those who think the Law is an ass, no, there’s a great deal of common sense in the Law of England”. He ought to have done that which was morally, ethically, responsibly and legally [it is a strict legal procedural constitutional requirement of all intendees of defection] incumbent upon him, as an intending defectee. Or else, he ought to have heard, speaking back to him in English legalese “I am not really an ass, you know. As you can hear, I can speak, and speak good legal English, too. So, I refuse to let you lead me to that dark, dirty, prohibited place to which you seem to want to”.
(4) Article 160 [(1) (a) (b) and (c) and 160 (2) (a) and (b)] eminently outlines the fundamental nature of the Party List to the candidate and to the electing public. A commitment, a compact, is made, under this Provision, between the electors and the candidate, with the expectation that the candidate shall earnestly and honestly support the electors’ political, economic and other such interests, on behalf of the electors, at any authorized fora, chief of which is the National Assembly. Without that overpowering condition, there would have been no need for Article 156.
(5) Each elector’s vote at the polls is the binding contract signed between the elector and the candidate, and that contract is endorsed and managed by the Party List’s Representative and the Speaker. It is a solemn Trust relationship, which can only be broken, to the peril of the Candidate, unless and until the Speaker or the electors’ Representative, rescinds that pact. He cannot break it otherwise. He could not be bound by contract to defend one Party against another, whilst deliberately sabotaging that interest, in favour of the other Party, and displaying such utter disregard for those norms, in the presence of a whole body of witnesses. In such a scenario, were one not absolutely convinced of the Speaker’s unquestionable integrity, one could be lulled into thinking – it is such a charming temptation — that his endorsing such chicanery, unwittingly or not, seemed to be active collaboration with the Member, to undercut and undermine the intent and purport of a fundamental Constitutional Provision, Article 156. The act of endorsing the Member’s breach of good faith towards, and trusteeship of, the electors’ vote, was, to say the least, a grave and an unfortunate faux pas,
(6) Had the Member written , as required, and was still allowed to vote, notwithstanding, then, and only then, were his vote to be taken as validly cast, because he would have given due notice of his intention, and still permitted by his Party and the Speaker, to vote as he did. In the absence of such a letter – a clear requirement- acceptance of his vote as valid, might seem, to the suspecting mind, be tantamount to a conspiratorial or collusionary act to defraud the electors of their vote, and casting it for the other side, permission and authority for which they never gave, nor intended to give, in the trusteeship arrangement with Candidate / Member Charrandass Persaud.
(7) Extrapolating a portion of Justice Saunders’ approving opinion in the CCJ’s decision on the ‘Presidential Third Term’ case, would, it seems to me, be appropriate and instructive here, in re-enforcing the inevitable connectivity between and amongst certain Articles [in this review, Articles 156 and 160. In that case, Articles 1, 9 and 90]. Justice Saunders held that “…that submission [that is, in the CCJ case] avoided any evaluation of the character of the amendments to Article 90 and therefore elevated form over substance. It specifically equates measures that lead to democratic decay with measures that strengthen democracy. It invites the court to disregard historical and surrounding context when assessing a possible violation of the normative statements contained in Articles 1 and 9 [highlights mine].”
In this No-Confidence matter, form was, indeed, elevated above substance, and there was a total disregard for historical and surrounding contexts, in assessing the normative statements of Articles 156 and 160.
(8) All Attorneys-at-law know that there was a time when ethical and other extra-legal considerations had no bearing on what the strict law demanded. That has long since changed. It is now absolutely necessary for those and ‘historical and surrounding contexts’ and the balancing of ‘substance’ with ‘form’ to be intentionally considered and applied. Adjudication on the ‘form’ of 156 cannot be soundly made without regard to its influencing and impactive environmental substance, Article 16.0, which gives essence and context to that form.
I rest my case.

G.F. Alert (Rev.)
Fitz Alert

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