High time the Medical Council and the way it discharges its functions be scrutinized

Aug 05, 2018 Letters

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Dear Editor,
Much more appears to be wrong with the operations of the present Medical Council than has been mentioned in the letter by Gustavo Kuerten in “Kaieteur Mailbox” of the 22nd July 2018 edition of Kaieteur News. Indeed, it does appear that the present Medical Council has as its priority the protection of the professional and financial interests of their members and their close associates in the medical profession rather than the public interests i.e., the availability and delivery of quality medical services of the people of Guyana.
Since the behavioural pattern of the present Medical Council is highly questionable, it behooves the Medical Council to answer the following questions:
1. Can Dr. Mahendra Carpen, a member of the present Medical Council, practice as a medical cardiologist in Canada where he obtained his post-graduate fellowship training? If he cannot do so in Canada, how could he be registered to practise in Guyana as a medical cardiologist?
2. Why are medical doctors of foreign nationalities (particularly of Cuban nationality) many of whom are qualified specialists being denied full registration when they have met all the statutory requirements, including the residency requirement to full registration? Does the answer lie in the selfish protection of turf and fear of competition? It is unconstitutional to discriminate on the ground of nationality.

3. Why is the grant of institutional registration being substituted for the grant of full registration when institutional registration can be granted only where the applicant has failed to meet one or more specified statutory requirement?

4. How can a medical practitioner who has served satisfactorily for one period of institutional registration be made to serve another period of institutional registration instead of being granted full registration as a matter of statutory entitlement? There is need only for a single period of satisfactory institutional registration for the grant of full registration.

5. Did the enabling provision under the Medical Practitioners Act (the main legislation) legally enable the Minister to make regulations for the suspension of a medical practitioner by the Medical Council pending the determination of a disciplinary charge against the medical practitioner? In other words, does the wording of the enabling provision of the Act lend itself to an interpretation, which enables the Minister, by regulation, to put the professional life of a medical practitioner on hold without a finding of fault being first made against him? It must be borne in mind that the issue is not suspension from an office but rather suspension from one’s profession. This has implications in respect of one’s right to work and to earn one’s livelihood. Such interim suspension from practising one’s profession does not obtain in the legal and other professions. Why should the enabling provision be so widely construed as to embrace the power to provide for such interim suspension in the medical profession?

6. Since, under the Regulations, suspensions, after a finding of guilt, is limited to only one year, is the Medical Council authorised to have a medical practitioner suspended for over a year pending the determination of a disciplinary charge against him i.e. before a finding of guilt? It is repotted that there is a Cuban-Guyanese doctor, Dr. Abel, who is under suspension for over a year pending the determination of a disciplinary charge. Even though the hearing has been concluded, and the report submitted to the Medical Council several months ago, Dr. Abel’s professional life is in limbo while the Medical Council dallies. Is this true? Why are professionals being kept out of practice for so long by their own peers?

7. How can Kamal Ramkaran be an in-house member of the Council and at the same time be legal advisor to the Council? If Mr. Ramkarran were to take one legal view as a member of the Council and the other members of the Council were to take a different legal view, surely Mr. Ramkarran cannot be expected to later proffer formal legal advice to the Council against his own view. If the Medical Council is a unitary body and Mr. Ramkarran is a member of that Council, it necessarily means that the Council is advisor to itself and Mr. Ramkarran cannot be legal advisor to the Council since he is not extrinsic to it. A distinction must be drawn between a lawyer-member of and a legal advisor to the Council. But that said, it does appear that the Council has too in-house a structure to properly function as a public authority. A cursory look at the racial composition of the membership of the Council and an examination of the way it purports to discharge its functions may give rise to suspicions and concerns. It may be that the Council hides behind the petticoat correspondence refined by its Afro-Guyanese secretary who has displayed an inclination to accept the role of an investigative operative in addition to that of a secretary.

8. Another important question to be answered relates to the membership of Dr. Frank Anthony, a known political activist of a major political party. How can Dr. Anthony, a partisan political activist, be a member of a public authority, which has overall responsibility for the disciplining of medical practitioners of differing political persuasions? Even if Dr. Anthony is impartial and unbiased, he lacks that appearance which each member of the Council ought to have. If Dr. Anthony is unable to see that his position as a partisan political activist of a major political party disqualified him from being a member of a disciplinary body such as the Medical Council, then he may well be not a ‘fit and proper’ person to be a Presidential Candidate.
Incidentally, the Medical Council has been less than frank in failing to disclose to the public that the recent decision of the C.C.J involving a Cuban doctor turned not on a matter of substance or merits but rather on procedural technicalities. The Court held that the doctor ought to have proceeded by way of statutory appeal rather than by judicial review proceedings. Undeniably, the C.C.J did castigate the doctor for stating ex post facto in his affidavit that he knew of no circumstance, which militated against the grant of his application for full registration when he must have known of the Council’s concern for an alleged breach of his institutional registration. Such an ex post facto statement to the Court could have had nothing to do with the merits or demerits of his prior application to the Council for full registration. In any event, the doctor was relying on his statutory entitlement to full registration – having met all the statutory requirements for the same and not on the exercise of any discretionary power in the Council. The decision of the C.C.J was that the doctor’s application to the High Court was procedurally misconceived in that he utilised the judicial review rather than the statutory appeal process. As recommended by the C.C.J during the hearing, the doctor did re-apply to the Council for full registration so that the Council can afford him a fair hearing including the right to be heard. The application was made soon after the C.C.J rendered its decision. But alas, the Medical Council is still to hear his reapplication after several months.
It is high time that the Medical Council and the manner that it purports to discharge its functions in the public interest be publicly scrutinized. There are many questions for the Council to answer.

(Concerned Citizen)

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