TACKLING CRIME AND VIOLENCE WITHIN THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM): Part Three

Oct 01, 2017 News

---

(Continued from last week)

Some thoughts of Fairbairn Egerton Liverpool

Police Corruption

Assuming the young 19-year old police constable in conversation 2 does not have any other means of income to finance his 5-year plan, surely the fact that he can think of such a plan much less boast of it, speaks volumes to the systemic and pervasive nature of police corruption in his Force.  With the powers of arrest in his hands and his 5-year plan on his mind, it may be inconceivable for us to think that he would resist the temptation of exploiting the vulnerable man in the street.  What is to be the fate of the vulnerable population?  How can they be protected from the criminal element within the police and without?

An informal conversational survey conducted by me of various police ranks in four Member States has confirmed that it’s a virtual impossibility to have a crime committed in any Member State of the Region without the knowledge of a member of the law enforcement community i.e., from the most junior, the constable, to the most senior, the Commissioner.  The million-dollar question to be answered is, if this is so, why has crime not been prosecuted with greater success?  How can police corruption be reduced?  

Strategies to Depoliticize Crime and Reduce Police Corruption.

The following are some of the strategies I offer for what they are worth with the hope that they may in some small way contribute to the debate to make the Caribbean Community safer:

Depoliticization of Crime

• Establish a Parliamentary Sub-committee of National Security.

The Commissioner of Police (COP) should be required to give account of his stewardship to a Parliamentary Sub-Committee of National Security and not to the Minister responsible for national security.  The Minister with the responsibility for national security in Parliament should, however, be the chairperson of that sub-committee and be the person responsible for reporting to Parliament on matters of public security. Appointing members of the parliamentary opposition on the sub-committee should go a long way towards reducing the blame game so prevalent currently in partisan politics;

• Authority to appoint the Commissioner of Police.

The appointment of the COP should be made by the Parliamentary Sub-Committee of National Security on the recommendation of the President or Prime Minister;

• Redesign of the Police Service Commission.

The Police Service Commission (PSC) is a relic of post colonialism, originally designed as a check and balance to control the police.  The PSC should be redesigned to be a civilian oversight in the management of the police force, with authority to conduct fitness for role and administrative inspections of the police and report to the Parliamentary Sub-Committee of National Security.

• Establishment of a Police Performance Merit System.

The PSC should also be responsible for performance awards of a merit system based on performance indicators emanating from strategic plans of the police. The performance indicators should be focused on the team though not exclusively so. In this way, commanders of the teams would be held responsible for the performance of the members of his or her team. Also in this way, if a member of the team is guilty of any misconduct, the commander should be held responsible;

• Full Responsibility of Police to the Commissioner of Police.

The COP should be given full responsibility for the police including promotions and discipline for all ranks; 

• Creation of A National Security Police Advisory Body.

This entity should be created as an advisory body on all public security policy matters to the Minister responsible for Public Security.  It is recommended that the representatives of what the author called the ‘Five P’s’ comprise this advisory body:

The Politician (the Minister),

The Police (the COP),

The People’s representative perhaps from Civil Society,

The Professional or Expert in the field of crime and security who may/may not be picked from the ranks of academia; and

The Press for consistency but which refers to the presence of the media for the needed transparency and possible public information.  Policy on public security should not be the responsibility of the politician alone.  Unpopular policy decisions may be avoided with the participation of the people’s representative on the advisory body.

Reduction of Police Corruption

• Internal Police Oversight.

Given the full responsibility of all aspects of the police force’s work and administration in the hands of the COP, it is fitting that the mechanisms of internal police integrity monitoring as recommended in various reforms, be established within the force to report to and give support to the COP;

• Investigative and Prosecutorial Powers to the Police Complaints Authority (PCA). The PCA should be given full police powers and capacity to investigate allegations of police misconduct and prosecute any member of the police force independent of the police.  Consideration should be given to subjecting the other law enforcement agencies independent of the police to the oversight of the PCA;
• Establishment of a Caribbean Police Service (CARIPOL). Most communities of nations have established supranational police organisations to perform certain functions in the interest of the member states of their communities. At the global level, there is Interpol and in the European Union there is Europol. Police literature speaks of the need to move police ranks tactically around the various police districts to avoid over familiarity that could breathe corruption.  In the small island states for most of the Caribbean, the employment of such a tactic would have severe limitations because of the smallness of the country and population. Therefore, the establishment of a regional mechanism under the umbrella of a CARIPOL would not only facilitate the employment of such police tactics but would also serve as a tremendous learning experience for the visiting ranks working at various levels from the streets to the offices within various member states.  The presence of strangers among the ranks of the local police will also serve as a deterrent to petty corrupt practices. Through CARIPOL also legal mechanisms could be established to facilitate various assistance programmes to the forces in need;

• Establishment of a Mutual Evaluation Mechanism among Region Police Forces. Under CARIPOL, a mutual evaluation mechanism not unlike the one in existence within the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) could be established to ensure compliance to universal professional police practices agreed on by the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP); and finally
• LEGALISE IT. This needs no explanation
  

Conclusion

In conclusion, I wish to once again emphasize that the above are just some thoughts being offered for consideration.  They are not intended as criticisms or to dictate public policy but rather to highlight the pervasive and complex nature of the problem which in my view is as a result of the symbiotic relationship between the two most destructive forces that undermine the rule of law in our Caribbean societies, politicization of crime and police corruption.  Together they undoubtedly present a challenge to and task for all of us and as the poet Martin Carter puts it “All are involved, all are consumed”.

---

---