Industrial Delinquency – We just cannot afford to repeat the (admitted) mistakes of the past

Mar 22, 2014 Letters

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DEAR EDITOR,

There is a patent lack of coherence in the flurry of heated exchanges about the current viability, and the future sustainability, of the sugar industry of Guyana.  But few of the contending parties, including the self-acclaimed decision-makers, can attest to any substantive acquaintance with this national institution prior to 1992; except of course the unionists, and the employees in situ.

Among the membership of effete boards of directors it has been difficult to detect any expertise that could add value to the efficacy of the decision-making process. This particular fault line has been further compromised by the politicos placed in over-arching authority, but who mistake their status as licence to make persistently uninformed and misinformed decisions.

The combination of technical and operational misdirections only contributes to the confusion which obtains amongst GUYSUCO’s Managers, culminating in a well recorded debilitation in the industry’s performance in delivering the following list of Plans:

1. Strategic Plan: 1998-2008
2. Strategic Blue Print: 2009-2013
3. Turnaround Plan: 2010-
4. Strategic Plan: 2012-2017
5. Strategic Plan: 2013-2018

Note four Plans between 2009 and 2013, reflective of a confused mindset (if not mindlessness).

The tragedy is that GUYSUCO’s spokespersons assume that all of their audience is as befuddled as they. The following is a brief examination of the respective Plans:

• Strategic Plan 1998-2008

 

In the 1999 Annual Report, GUYSUCO’s Chairman remarked on the enthusiastic reception given the Plan by “most multilateral Institutions, our major customers, commercial Bankers and members of the Diplomatic Community”.

Features of the Plan included:

–       “Increase production to 500’000 tonnes in two phases

–       Decrease average costs to below USc17/lb

–       Extend CARICOM market coverage and size

–       Develop new regional markets

–       Add value through special sugars, co-generation, distillery and refinery (if feasible)

–       Work to develop intra-Caribbean markets for refined sugar.”

GUYSUCO planned to add value by way of packaged special sugars: golden granulated, standard Demerara; and light Muscovada.

So far as expansion of the cane cultivation, a total of 12,000 hectares (ha), of which 4,000 ha would be private farmers’, was envisaged.

• Strategic Blueprint: 2009-2013

The Plan revised the cost of production as shown in the Table below. [Actual for 2012 and 2013 have been inserted for easy comparison]

 

YEAR	PROJECTED COST PER TON	ACTUAL
2009	29.7	NA
2010	23.2	NA
2011	21.2	NA
2012	20.4	36.49
2013	19.6	39.90

 

All this unacceptable increase in cost during a period when the workforce was reduced from 28,000 to 18,000 – 35.7% – a contradiction which begs to be explained.

But what this planned reduction achieved was also to send more than just a subliminal message to future recruits that career prospects in the industry were becoming increasingly limited; and that it was time to seek alternatives. The population demographics in the Berbice Region speak for themselves – a response in kind to the government’s positive policy of encouraging investments in new developmental areas, mostly away from the coast; complemented by the provision of incentives for small business development, thus stimulating self-employment.

The reality of local migration from traditional sugar employment is further reflected in reported low attendance rates.  Overseas migration is also to be taken into account.

 

• Turnaround Plan 2010-

 

Already by 2010 the situation was perceived to be so desperate that GUYSUCO’s Turnaround Plan actually conceived of transferring the Industry’s Health Services to the ‘State’.  Imagine this gross insensitivity of the employer to the employees’ health and welfare in a labour-intensive operation.

 

• Strategic Plan 2012-2017

 

This Plan was considered so innocuous that GUYSUCO’s new Executive Chairman promptly replaced it with a

 

• Strategic Plan 2013-2018 version

 

From this perspective the latest Plan reflected the same defects in terms of the methodology of its construction, as its short-lived predecessor.

Like all the others, they first needed to be inspired by the very Vision which GUYSUCO had formulated i.e. “To be a world class industry, producing high quality sugar and added value by-products, while ensuring customer satisfaction, employee development, environmental protection, and safe working practices. In so doing we will achieve growth and sustained profitability in order to contribute to the economic and social development of Guyana”.

Even the purblind would by now recognize the extent, to which these legitimate aspirations have been dissipated.

An important element of strategic planning is the breadth and depth of participation that should contribute to the final product – a logical incentive for Managers who must operationalise the various components, based on a clear understanding of the level of individual and team effort involved.

In the particular case of GUYSUCO the organisation should be regarded as comprising of seven independent operations, while at the same time interlinked in a common effort to achieve industry goals and objectives.  As the whole is composed of the sum of its parts, it follows that each should develop its own strategic objective and Plan – to be subsequently integrated into an over-arching strategy comprised, of course, of detailed Annual Plans to be monitored and evaluated by a dedicated multi-skilled task force. None of these features are currently discernible.

The foregoing should provide pause for reflection, not from an emotional standpoint, but from a more objective appreciation of a dilemma that would not go away, as a consequence of persistent denials of the situational facts, and of the clutter of obfuscatory pronouncements made over the past decade – exemplified by the article published in KN of March 15, 2014; Cane Farming Committee Blazes Political Opposition – a clear ‘plant’.

It is a recognizable press release.  Pathetically it speaks of ‘Committee’, ‘Association’ and ‘Board’ in the same breath.

The National Cane farming Committee Act and accompanying Regulations established a legal Contract to be entered into between the Manufacturer and the Cane Farmer. But this law has been consistently honoured in the breach by the current administration. There is no legitimate Committee appointed according to the extant law, an extract of which is reproduced hereunder for information.

“Second Schedule

Appendix A

Rules of the Contract

Costs to be taken into Account and Method of Computing Charges for Drainage and Irrigation Facilities. R 4(7)

Appendix B

Rules of Contract

Cost to be taken into Account and Method of Computing charges to Farmers for Cane Transport by Water. R. 8(2)”.

The Committee was to be composed, as provided by Section 3 of the Act, of members appointed by the Minister, including its chairman and vice chairman, as follows:

“a)   eight persons chosen by the Minister from among farmers who have been recommended for appointed by District Associations;

Provided that until such time as District Associations have been established under section 8, the minister may appoint any farmer or any district;

b)    three persons chosen by the Minister from a panel of seven nominated by the Association;

c)     five official members; and

d)    one person nominated by the Development Corporation.”

Section 11 of the Act deals with:

a)        “the general conditions which shall be deemed to be incorporated in every contract;

b)       the registration of farmers;

c)        the registration of contracts;

d)        the records to be kept by farmer and the furnishing of reports and returns by them to the Committee; and

e)        exemption, in special circumstances, contracts from the application of the general conditions provided for under paragraph (a) of this subsection.”

There would be need to identify the District Associations of cane farmers who must be registered.

Also since the Cane Faming Development Corporation is defunct, the law should be amended to involve any relevant financial institution that may exist.

In any case transparency demands the publication of the membership of the purported NCFC.

The above is an example of the type of dissemblance to which the non-observant has been subjected over the years – an indulgence that cannot possibly retrieve the continuing depreciation of the industry’s performance; assure its survival; nor in the process restore the morale so profoundly missing amongst employees.

Hopefully this review will stimulate more balanced evaluation of the industry’s free fall. The Sugar Industry is not just a business. It inheres a deep cultural and social history that is part of the psyche of every citizen born on this coastland. All therefore have a vested interest in its longevity. It is our heritage.

So that the mismanagement and hollow promises are hardly fulfilling of the Vision crafted for our industry. It is incumbent upon all of us therefore to be honest, bite the bullet and agree on the formation of a fully representative enquiry of this critical portion of our Nation’s future. Perhaps the most important contribution that can be made at such a forum would be from the employees themselves – as priority stakeholders, and not just as a partisan electorate.

True leadership makes allowance neither for pretence, nor indeed for mediocrity. The difference between leaders and false prophets is recognisable. The current discordant babel for example, seems totally to ignore Professor Emeritus Clive Thomas’ carefully researched series of articles on the crisis in our sugar industry.

We just cannot afford to repeat the (admitted) mistakes of the past.

E.B. John

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