Two different Courts: Public opinion vs. Legal reasoning

Apr 02, 2012 Letters

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Dear Editor,
While holding no court for Mr. Greene, as I followed this matter, based upon what was offered in the press, I became more and more convinced that, as a matter of criminal liability, the Director of Public Prosecutions would be hard pressed to present to the court, a credible body of facts and evidence that could be calibrated to any set of elements that would give legal muster a charge of rape. I was sure Mr. Greene would be exonerated in a pre-trial court of law – a totally different construction from the court of public opinion and emotion.
The Chief Justice’s concerns and questions, iterated in his opinion, mirror my own; and they go to the core of evidentiary accumulation and analysis; understandably, a process to which general society does not avail itself. To those who would cry foul and question the Chief Justice’s decision, I would caution that you read his opinion meticulously to see the holes that actually existed in the complainant’s story; particularly the chain of events  after their first meeting and, more so, the continued contacts after the event of the alleged rape.
The uninformed rush by many to demand  Mr. Greene’s  head, based on the allegations of the complainant,  could have been tempered by the simple consideration that there were only two eye witnesses to whatever occurred between them – the complainant and the accused. When there are no other eye witnesses who can testify with pellucid conviction as to their observation of what actually happened, and when there is no other direct evidence that could corroborate the commission of the alleged criminal action, a trier of fact must rely on circumstantial evidence; which is defined in part as: “proof of a chain of facts and circumstances indicating that the person is either guilty or not guilty”. Additionally, circumstantial evidence must be buttressed by the applications of inference and reasonableness based on the human experience: In all, when it is applied, it must yet meet the legal standard of having no gaps in which reasonable doubt can exist.  For example, it is reasonable to expect that an aggrieved rape victim would make a police report immediately after the carnal violation has occurred. At the same time, the wider the gap grows between the alleged crime and the complaint, the lesser would be the credibility of the eventual complaint.
Of course, these situations are not absolute; but what is troubling in the case under consideration here is that in addition to the lengthy time lapse in bring the charge, the self-acclaimed victim occasioned several liaisons with the accused after the event of the alleged rape. The Chief Justice was present with a chain of events by the Director of Public Prosecution who failed to provide legally acceptable explanations for the gaps and missing links therein; leaving him no recourse but to reject the proposition that a crime had been committed. Note well, there is no dispute that there was sexual activity between Mr. Green and the complainant: Given the circumstances of their meeting, as immoral as that may be, it is not criminal.
Another misplaced alarm that came on the heels of Justice Chang’s decision, published in the online edition GT-Brutal Facts, saw the Chief Justice as corrupted and compromised; and further suggested that women in Guyana must continually live in fear. True enough, society at large needs to be vigilant and active in proliferating, promoting and protecting the rights and status of women with regard to their quest for equality with their men folk: That notwithstanding, the merits of that article, yet cannot be interfaced successfully with the well reasoned decision of Justice Chang.  Such otherwise justified, sociological opining would find better consort in ongoing articulations for that gender’s ascendancy to their rightful equality with men.
Notably though, one is left to wonder  whether the Chief justice’s obvious attack on the competence of the Director of Public Prosecution, at least in the extant matter, is warranted. It seems as though the Chief Justice spared no effort to criticize and admonish the prosecutorial arm of the nation’s judicial system. I would opine that he went so far in his criticism of the prosecutorial offering in this case, intentionally or not, that it would constitute a warning to the government that it ought to look at the leadership of the Directorate of Public Prosecutions; a consideration not alien to the a prevailing notion that the current administration continues to further the Jagdeo-implemented practice of appointing political hacks(no pun intended)to critically important government positions, their lack of experience and qualifications, being no bar.
In conclusion, before any rush to vilify Chief Justice Chang, one should meticulously read the opinions upon which his decision rests. The guidance about the affairs of women and how they fare — and fear — in patrician societies and what ought to obtain for their rise to equality with their men-folk is appropriate; however, in the matter at hand, such noble cogitations, standing alone, must remain insufficient, in considering the criminal culpability of the morally challenged and ignoble police commissioner.
Wrickford Dalgetty
Brooklyn, NY

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