Socialization of corruption occurs when frontline cops expect favours

Jan 15, 2012 Letters

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Dear Editor,
The first paragraph of my last letter on the need for another approach to policing should have read “I am of the firm view that hardly anyone who knows me can argue successfully that I am unsympathetic to the problems of the Guyana Police Force (GPF).”  I guess I could have added that these problems should not be of the GPF’s making.  I recall two incidents some years ago; one was a Sunday morning conversation I had with a senior officer of the Guyana Police Force when he agreed with my observation that we should do everything possible to change the system which was fast losing its credibility due to a growing perception that the Force was on its way to becoming corrupt; the second memory is an incident involving Mr. Benn’s son in a Mandela Avenue confrontation with the police.  My reasoning on both situations was that if we fail to take the necessary corrective steps then we should not complain when our relatives become the victims of unprofessional actions on the part of police members.  This brings me to the claims/allegations/denials of police corruption which have been with us for quite some time.  First off we need to ask ourselves whether corruption allegations reflect a reality or reside in the realm of fevered imaginations.  Let us attempt a review of certain universal features of police corruption to derive a clearer understanding of this condition and put it to rest one way or another.
Bahn (1975) defines corruption as “…a combination of the element of failure to carry out approved police practice with an element of direct personal gain to the officer involved.”  Straight off one ought to realise that one potentially damaging effect of police corruption wherever it might be found is the undermining of a government’s legitimacy which is supported by Conklin (1986) who posits that if citizens perceive the mandated enforcers of the law as violators of the law, they may feel no obligation to abide by the law generally.  This could be regarded to mean that if John Q Public is of the view that police allegedly commit offences with seeming impunity then it is quite alright to commit similar offences, and possible worse.  Gerald Lynch (1974) at the American Psychological Association Annual Convention described police corruption as insidious, in that it begins in a “small and almost benign sidestepping of an issue … believing one cannot stop something bigger than oneself.”  McNamara (1975) commenting on “The Impact of Bureaucratic Dysfunctions on attempts to prevent police corruption” lists several factors which contribute to corruption as: low police salaries, low prestige of the force, the negative aspects of police work and frustrations of the police.  Some of us are old enough to identify Misner’s (1975) contribution “The Organization and Social Setting of Police Corruption” with certain aspects of our not so recent history when he argues that corruption also emerges in a climate of unpopular laws where police officers are expected to enforce those laws despite the fact that the police are also negatively affected by such laws.  .  What is revealing is a realization that under “normal” circumstances the police expect of themselves a standard of behaviour that is higher than other members of society.  However, this does not ignore the fact that the police’s responsibility for law enforcement, regulation and inspection exposes them to “corruption-provoking” opportunities in much the same way as other “high risk” occupations including the magistracy, judiciary, customs officials, and statutory inspectorate bodies.  Whatever the reason for its presence, no factor ought to be proffered or accepted in validation of any unethical practice in corrupt institutions.
A point to note is that politicians are not exempt in the apportioning of blame on the question of police corruption; this is especially so when they seek to use the police in pursuit of narrow partisan objectives, and as instruments for the repression of popular movements and sentiments.  A largely ignored consequence of such politically inspired contradictions is the compulsion that police officers feel to engage in a host of unethical and illegal practices at the individual; bureaucratic; criminal; and political levels.  Using the USAID Program Brief on Anticorruption and Police Integrity (Security Reform Program) May 2007 as a basis there are several forms of police corrupt practices across the various levels including: (Petty) – bribes from ordinary civilians; gifts and free services; “losing” court files; evidence, etc.; theft during searches; keeping seized contraband; (Bureaucratic) – contracting and purchasing kickbacks, sweetheart deals, etc. theft of assets and police resources including salaries and benefits; systems; lower ranks pay, etc.; selling information such as criminal files, records, and evidence, etc.; irregular and unlawful issuing of gun licenses and other permits; undermining internal investigations and discipline; bribes and kickbacks for recruitment, graduation from training, assignments, and promotions; (Criminal) – bribes or kickbacks from known criminals; extorting regular pay-offs from criminal groups/gangs, etc.; providing support for criminal activities with equipment, information, cover-ups, etc.; direct participation in crime and organized crime (drug trafficking; kidnapping rings; “arrest-for-ransom”; “social cleansing”; theft of seized contraband; protection of illegal economic activities (resource extraction); (Political) – manipulating criminal investigations; initiating false investigations; providing confidential information to politicians; suppressing freedom of speech and association (public demonstrations, strikes and other union activities, etc.); carrying out or covering up political killings; suppressing political dissent / freedom of information.
Editor, corruption does not just simply happen; socialization of corruption in the case of petty or individual corruption (which is likely to evolve to the other levels) may occur initially when the frontline police rank learns to accept and (expect) small favours from those s/he has sworn to serve and protect/defend.
It would be convenient to think that small favours (cash or services) are of no serious import especially when we consider the nature of police work.  However, the next step in the socialization process is the offering and acceptance of substantial sums of cash to enable the rank to purchase those gifts and services, thus creating a feeling of pseudo-independence.
Bahn (ibid) argues that even if no overt approach is made by the police officer, the remotest hint or attitude of passive acceptance may be considered a demand with “extortionate force.”
It may also be argued that it is the member of the public who introduces the officer to those “favour acceptance” situations in a subtle attempt to “curry favour” with the police through one individual in the first instance, then gradually with a wider circle of police officers preferably at higher levels.
Of course this pattern does not preclude initial contact being made with the upper echelons of the police service who could then direct junior ranks to perform certain “duties” in compliance with the expressed or implied wishes of those ostensibly “upright citizens” with whom the seniors consort.
It should therefore be borne in mind that it is always to someone’s advantage to offer inducements to police ranks who having grown accustomed to a life above their means will be all the more eager to be manipulated by their unofficial paymaster(s).  Misner (ibid) maintains that the police officer is exposed to “opportunities and characters whose self-interest lies in the corruption of the police.”
Editor space constraints prevent me from examining factors such as internal dynamics; internal affairs and morale so I will conclude this review by looking at some elements of a reciprocal arrangement.
When John Q Public offers favours and/or services, this is done with the expectation of reciprocity which runs along the line of: prior information of police operations and likely targets; confidential information or other sensitive material which has the potential of compromising the performance of fellow officers; complicity on the part of the corrupt officer in ordering those officers not corruptly influence on dangerous assignments with inadequate information or support; exposing officers who may be valuable in undercover operations by pressuring them into public appearances as police officers using specious arguments as justification etc..
One way of ensuring that there is no opportunity for reciprocity of any kind is by the officer firmly refusing a favour in the face of continued offers by the criminally incline who emerges from any level of society be it as a drug dealer; petty criminal; or under the guise of merchant or other business person.
The refusal of favours is even more significant in light of the argument that as the police officer grows accustomed to accepting gratuities from persons other that the State, there is no conflict in his mind and he is easily able to rationalize actions in the execution of his duties.
The relevant state actors need to provide assurances through reinforcement of the concept that corruption within police services will be dealt with in a swift and condign manner.
The success of that approach depends on the perception junior ranks have vis-à-vis the level of tolerance of corruption demonstrated by senior functionaries.
This is especially so since an argument can be made that lower ranks could be inclined to refer their behaviour contextually to the high level of tolerance and practice of corruption on the part of higher officials.
Patrick E. Mentore

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