Federalist Power Sharing

Feb 27, 2011 Features / Columnists, Ravi Dev

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While in a plural society, the benefits of federalism increase exponentially; in Guyana it will immediately addresses the African Ethnic Security Dilemma.
Extreme behaviour in plural societies erupts from a confluence of experience or perceptions by one or more groups that is being denied its legitimate share or power and the national patrimony by the political system.
We suggest that because of our ethnic pattern of geographical distribution, federalism can be an effective mechanism to assist in an equitable sharing of power and patrimony in Guyana.
Firstly, it abolishes “winner-take-all politics”, which is inherent in a unitary state structure, especially in the absence of national coalitions.
The Federal system also permits national coalitions for the national Executive. The zero-sum feature that insists where there is a winner, there must be a loser, is what gives politics its life and death intensity in divided societies.
With true multiethnic parties almost impossible to sustain in severely divided societies such as Guyana, the party in power is invariably seen as representing one ethnic group to the detriment of the others. Federalism ensures that the political game becomes variable sum, in that every group is guaranteed at least something at the state level.
Some have objected to this proposal by pointing out that one would simply be transferring the political violence to one level below. This misapprehends the African Security Dilemma.
The latter is triggered when it is calculated that Indians will dominate everything in Guyana. Control of Demerara – especially an expanded one that could include Region 10 – the most developed State is not an inconsiderable prize, especially since other innovations will also give them a share of the national pie.
Secondly, the criticism misunderstands the thrust of “Integrative Federalism”. The intent to resolving the ethnic conflict is not to have ethnically homogenous populations but in fact to have multiethnic states preferably where in each, one particular ethnic group constitutes a large majority.
Under such conditions, the members of that ethnic group, assured that their group will win at the polls under whatever combination, will form several political parties to compete for office.
In this increased intra-ethnic rivalry scenario, there will be every incentive for one or more groups from the majority section to seek alliances with the minority section and thus moderate their rhetoric.
Secondly, when the centre does not possess all power, the struggle to control it will not be as intense. Additionally, since the electorate is now split, rivalry within ethnic groups [intra-ethnic rivalry], should increase.
For instance, Indian politicians dominant in Berbice, will see themselves as rivals for power at the centre. This intra-ethnic rivalry should increase since, if particular ethnic groups are overwhelmingly dominant in separate states, they should not feel threatened by “out” groups.
This removes the incentives to calls for “not splitting the votes”, and “vote for your own”. Conversely, rivalry between ethnic groups (inter-ethnic rivalry), should decrease due to the lessened possibility of a majority seizing all power for all time.
Conflict is thus engineered away from the centre towards local levels, where the stakes are much lower and can be more easily contained – and also away from between ethnic groups, where the intensity can reach the most bestial levels.
Thirdly, federalism will encourage cooperation and coalitions at the centre, depending on the specific issue being debated there.
These coalitions can cut across ethnic lines due to the diverse demands that would emanate from the different states. Berbice might have a common position with Demerara to push for the development of Bauxite lets say, which may be opposed by Essequibo focusing on gold. This type of shifting alliance will introduce fluidity to Guyanese politics, which has never been present.
As political parties move away from bipolar confrontation, towards a more multipolar balance, they should lower the temperature of their polemics.
After all, today’s rival may become tomorrow’s ally. It is with the negotiation of these issues that the bonds are forged between politicians who may then proceed to more permanent relationships.
Fourthly, federalism reduces disparities between groups by actually forcing underrepresented groups to participate in government, education, economic development and all the other activities of the modern state.
These groups will have the guarantee at the state level of receiving the experience, which may catapult them into the national arena.
Indigenous Guyanese, for instance, would finally have the experience of actually running their own affairs.
Fifthly, a Federal structure will facilitate the formation of a second chamber in the legislature.
Because, as we mentioned earlier, each state would have ethnically different majorities, the representation drawn from state-constituencies would most likely reflect the ethnic diversity of our country.
This fortuitous circumstance gives us the opportunity of securing ethnic representation without resorting to devices such as separate electoral rolls.
This second chamber should have the power to scrutinize all legislation in general, but specifically enumerated powers in reference to ethnic issues.
Sixthly, Federalism will further the democratic political imperative to make Government more responsive and closer to the people.
Local state Governments, being closer to the populace, should be more sensitive to the idiosyncrasies of its regions and citizens. Police Forces would be representative of local populations, thus partially addressing the Indian Security Dilemma.
Lastly, since Guyana would remain as a single country, all citizens would be free to move throughout the country in an unhampered manner. While States/Regions may set residency requirements for certain benefits, they would not be able to prohibit any Guyanese citizen from moving into a state or settling there.

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