THE GLUE THAT BINDS THE OPPOSITION TOGETHER IN A COALITION

Jun 23, 2010 Features / Columnists, Peeping Tom

---

Any coalition has to be united around some principal idea. Without a welding principle, coalitions eventually find themselves facing internal fissures and self-destruct. So, is there something around which the joint opposition parties can band together?
There are moves afoot to cobble a coalition to contest against the PPP/C in next year’s general and regional elections. But what is it that is going to cement this alliance other than the naked desire to remove the PPP from office?
A desire simply for change has never been enough to ensure the longevity of any coalition. Three examples immediately spring to mind. The first of these was the attempt by the Patriotic Coalition for Democracy (PCD) which splintered over differences engineered by forces within and outside of Guyana. The disintegration of the PCD proved that more than just a desire for change is needed. The second example was the demise of the Committee in Defence of Democracy, which was unable to obtain internal cohesion between its ideologically disparate membership. Thus, some form of unity of beliefs is needed to hold a coalition together.
The third example occurred in Trinidad and Tobago, when there was a coalition between the United National Congress (UNC) and National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR). This arrangement flopped because the major coalition partner, the UNC, was sidelined within the government. Any coalition therefore has to have agreements as to how decisions are going to be made and power distributed both during and after elections.
A coalition therefore has to be built around more than just a quest for power. It can be built around a common ideology, but declaring their ideologies is something that the local opposition parties have shied away from. The PPP has hardly, over the past eighteen years, demonstrated any communist leanings in its economic policies and thus ideological differences are not going to prove a rallying point to unite the opposition parties.
Developing a joint program has been suggested as a way forward, but this is more applicable when the economy is in tatters. This is not the case, and therefore a joint economic plan is not likely to be seen as a uniting force.
A second suggestion is for an alliance to press for constitutional reform. This is a no-go, because it plays right into the hands of those who are pressing for a removal of presidential term limits. There is insufficient time and little political will to pursue this effort.
The main area in which unity is likely to be achieved is on the political front. Ethnic unity is seen as an important objective of national development. All of the opposition parties subscribe to the need for ethnic unity. The PNCR is on record as calling for power-sharing. Other parties may favour a national government. Therein lies the best adhesive for coalition-building. Power-sharing can be the basis upon which a joint opposition alliance can be constructed.
The PNCR has made it clear that it is unreservedly committed to shared governance. During the 2006 election campaign, it indicated that should it win the election it would bring the PPP into the government. There is no indication that the main opposition has changed its position. In fact it had consistently reaffirmed its commitment to shared governance.
The PNCR is likely to be the dominant partner in any joint opposition alliance. The AFC is likely to be the second most influential force. The other parties will be mere hangers-on. They do not have the necessary voter support to be sources of influence within a joint opposition alliance. Essentially, what we are looking at is an alliance between the AFC and the PNCR, with a few stragglers making up numbers.
As an aside, it has to be asked whether this possibility of an alliance between the AFC and the PNCR is the reason for the controversy involving rotation of leadership within the AFC. If such alliance is to be advanced it cannot be cemented merely by the desire to remove the PPP, but can be put together on the basis of a common commitment to shared governance.
But the AFC is not sold the question of power-sharing. It may, like all political parties, be committed to some airy fairy ideal of national unity, but it has never projected itself as being an ardent advocate of shared governance.
If the alliance-building process is therefore to get anywhere, it will be necessary for the AFC to be converted to executive power-sharing, for shared governance seems to be the only viable adhesive to weld the PNCR and the AFC together.
So is the AFC willing to support the shared governance model as proposed by the PNCR? Is the AFC willing, as the PNCR says it is willing to do, to share power with the PPP should an all opposition alliance be able to win the largest bloc of votes at the next elections?
If the answers to these questions are yes, then there is no reason why the AFC should not join the PNCR in voting the PPP out of office, but not totally out of the power configuration.

---

---