The PNCR’s ‘camouflage’ strategy

Nov 23, 2009 Letters

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Dear Editor,
The scramble for power is an ugly sight in Guyana. Everything else takes second place in this insufferable ‘power’ stampede; creating in its scurrilous path a charade of unscrupulous demands.
Self-interests, not the people’s interests, continue to mar the political life of this nation; the constant humbug of unprincipled demands for changes in electoral rules and systems, the relentless and selfish haggling over shared governance; the predictable election writs; unyielding bickering over constitutional reform; media distortions; the race card; and yes, the street protests, among others, are what we have come to expect during an election season from  a very weakened PNCR; and today, their bullying tactics persist with the unveiling of the Opposition-dossier on human rights abuses, a camouflage with historical precedence for the PNCR.
But the people possess the power to end this political nuisance, a political tragedy in some sense.
Many PNCR commentators, in recent years, linked their street protests to the economic and social disadvantage that mainly African supporters experienced. Nowadays, the PNCR links this economic and social disadvantage of its supporters to the current criminality.
Further, these PNCR commentators believe that the PPP/C continues to treat the PNCR supporters with contempt through blatant electoral frauds emanating from 1992, again a startling and sustained script of lies and videotape on the part of the PNCR. Each time the PNCR lost an election since the 1960s, they took to the streets to tell supporters that the loss was not really a loss but a victory, were there no cheating; a camouflage.
In the 1960s after suffering defeat at the election, the PNC voiced concerns at the PPP Administration’s pivotal emphasis on agriculture through its budget. The PNC protested, citing marginalisation as their concern.  They contended that the majority of their support came from non-agricultural settings, and so the budget, by heavily focusing on agriculture, failed to provide for them, and therefore marginalised their supporters.
I think all Guyanese would agree that agriculture was and continues to be the mainstay of the economy, and so, any right-thinking government would have no choice under such conditions but to emphasise agriculture, albeit in a more diversified way today. And so, the PNC’s acrimony toward agriculture was another kind of camouflage.
Both the 1992 and 1997 electoral defeats invoked the PNCR’s cries of rigged elections.  History already recorded the 1985 election as the most massively-rigged, actually under the late PNCR Leader Mr. Hugh Desmond Hoyte’s tutelage.  And then in 2001, after Hoyte’s three successive electoral losses, the PNCR’s wailing returned to marginalisation.  Apparently, the logic of electioneering within the PNCR is to socialize their supporters to believe that they have won all the elections, i.e., that they would only lose if the elections were fraudulent, another camouflage.
Clearly, the PNCR today as before, can only sustain street protests through the use of the ethnic card.  The ethnic card is necessary and sufficient for them because, allegedly, most of their supporters are African Guyanese. The ethnic card invokes ethnic sentiments and divisions at electoral periods for the purpose of giving a political aspirant an advantage at this time. Apparently, the logic of electioneering within the PNC/R is to socialize their supporters to believe that they were victors at all the elections, i.e., that they would only lose if the elections were fraudulent.
Allegations of rigged elections by the PNCR, is now a normative strategy to make the country ungovernable, should they suffer loss at any election. In the early months leading up to the 2001 elections, the PNC/R introduced the voters’ list malady (padded list) to their supporters in a calculated and manipulative socialization process, to ensure that the presence of a padded list became part of their supporters’ psyche and belief system.
Therefore, when the PNCR’s defeat becomes official, they then have the understandable, but, of course, the unenviable and inevitable task of aggressively explaining to their supporters that they experienced cheating and that they did not suffer any loss. This manipulative socialization process softens the aftermath of electoral defeat for their supporters, in order to sustain their cooperation for political agitation, to put it mildly.
Seemingly for the PNCR, a street protest serves two functions. One, protest is a form of projection whereby the PNCR blames the PPP/C for their loss. Two, protest has the capability to create intense destabilization, which could induce the fall of a government.  Some of the organised criminal groups may very well be surrogates for the disintegrated street protests to achieve the goal of bringing down this democratically-elected Government.
Aside from the cries against disenfranchisement and demands for house-to-house verification, the PNCR perpetually advances the notion that its 42% votes in the 2001 elections provides it with some bargaining power for shared governance; albeit that shared governance already is evolving.
Let’s review the electoral results of other multiethnic societies, focusing particularly on the oppositions’ percentage share of votes. The election results follow.
Fiji (2006) – all parties not included:
SDL – 50.7%
FLP – 43.6%
The SDL formed the Government.
Mauritius (2005)
Social Alliance –             60%
All Opposition Parties – 40%
The Social Alliance formed the Government.
Great Britain (2005) – all parties not included:
Labour     –          55.1%
Conservative – 30.6%
The Labour Party formed the Government.
United States of America (2008) – all parties not included:
Republican –  41.01%
Democratic – 58.98%
The Electoral College chooses the President. The Democratic Party formed the Government.
Trinidad & Tobago (2008) – all parties not included:
UNC –     29.7%
PNM – 46%
The PNM formed the Government.
The interpretation of the percentage share of votes for all parties relates to the agreed rules of engagement vis-à-vis the Constitutions of these countries. The opposition party in each country obtained a sizeable proportion of votes, but not enough to form a government; and the opposition remains the opposition with limited shared governance in some of these countries via the Congressional committee work in the U.S. Congress.
In Guyana, the opposition’s contribution and participation in the governance process have locus standi in Parliament via substantial committee work; these also include representations on boards and oversight committees serving as a watchdog on Government activities.
Not too long ago, in order to solidify their demands for house-to-house verification, some opposition elements called for the return of street protests. And the usual consequences followed: the protests exacted an unfair measure of violence on innocent Indians and Africans. Do the Guyanese people want more street protests? Did these opposition elements legitimately represent anyone? And why was there such irrational noncompliance with the rulings of the independent GECOM? Another scenario is worth noting; non-complying activists, falsely presenting themselves as political models, failed to observe electoral norms; clearly, manipulative ethnic conflict egging on street protests is not the answer, and the people must reject them.
The ethnic card is a weapon invariably used as a subterfuge, enabling political aspirants to gain advantage at electoral times. Ethnic conflicts, deeply rooted in colonialism, continue to shape the behaviours of all non-Whites, and in this context, the quest for political power today exploits ethnic diversity to gain political advantage. In effect, failed political activists as a gambit for racism hatched and manipulated these ethnic conflicts vis-à-vis election street protests.
Failed activists’ agitation for street protests is not related to racism; the agitation is associated with loss of political power and an obsession to regain political control. Without the ethnic card, failed political activists would be unable to sustain street protests in a multiethnic social fabric.
Although Guyana is at the crossroads, power cannot be taken by any means necessary, and indeed, not through perceived intimidation as street protests; or this new ‘dossier’.  Today, the route to power in a democracy is only via the ballot box.
Prem Misir

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