Do the right (policing) thing

Nov 15, 2009 Features / Columnists, Ravi Dev

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Last week we promised to expand on the notion of a more representative police force as an integral aspect of good policing in a diversified society such as ours by looking at the experience of the British. Even though almost every country with ethnically diverse populations has addressed the ethnic makeup of their law enforcement forces, we chose the British experience because all our politicians approved their involvement in the Security Sector Reform Project (SSRP). The objections raised by the administration on “sovereignty” are unrelated to the issue of better policing.
We noted the inherent authoritarian nature of our GPF on account of its model being the Irish Royal Constabulary (IRC) rather than the London Metropolitan Police (LMP) when it was formed in 1839. The IRC, originally chosen as the model by local authorities in 1838, was discarded: it was too citizen-centred. The IRC was militarily centralized, heavily armed and ethnicized: it consisted mostly of Irish Protestants and English Officers, to ensure the imposition of order against the predominantly Catholic population. Its local mirror-image GPF was to “serve and protect” the colonial rulers against the Guyanese people.
It is not happenstance, therefore, that in ordinary labour disputes on the sugar plantations – in 1872, 1896, 1903, 1913, 1924, 1939, and 1948 – dozens of workers were shot and killed by the police. Deadly force was also used in urban riots of 1856, 1888, 1905. The authoritarian nature of the GPF is so embedded in its culture that nothing other than a complete overhaul and institutionalisation of new values will make any difference. This is a threshold necessary reform.
As mentioned, in 1993 a single act of racism by the LMP, which was not allowed to be covered up by the authorities as had been the norm, led to an Inquiry in 1999. It prompted a major overhaul in the racial “representativeness” – which had not been a factor when they were formed – of the British police as an integral aspect of their professionalisation. In that year, Race Equality Employment targets for the next ten years were introduced for the police forces (now dubbed “Services”).
The overall national target was set at 7% and the LMP at 25%. The focus was to aggressively pursue recruitment, retention and progression of minority ethnic officers and staff. Initiatives varied from force to force but included targeted advertising, mentoring, familiarisation days, open days and seminars directed at minority groups. As of last year, with one year to go while the targets were not met, there had been a doubling of the national percentage of minority police from 2% to 4.1% and in the LMP to 8.2 %. One of the major reasons for the shortfall in achieving targets has been the low rate of turnover of officers.
In our circumstance, even before the present imbroglios, because of intense pressure by the PPP during the 1960’s riots – when the African-dominated Police and Volunteer Forces had displayed ethnic partiality – the British had established an ethnically balanced Special Services Unit (SSU) in 1964. It was disbanded in 1965 by the PNC. But as part of the British-imposed conditions for granting independence, an International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) panel was deployed to investigate ethnic representativeness in the state institutions. It recommended a 75% recruitment of Indians until the GPF became representative of the population. After observing the stricture for one year, the PNC reverted to the old pattern that exists into the present. While one could understand the PNC’s realpolitik rationale, the PPP’s retreat into quiescence on the issue was more inexplicable.
Ashton Chase, a founder of the PPP – and a perennial insider – speculated that the party, “allowed these recommendations to go a-begging for fear of being stigmatized as an ‘Indian’ party.” After riots greeted the PPP’s electoral victory in 1992, the one-man B.O. Adams Commission of Inquiry recommended that “the Police Force be more ethnically balanced and that the Government have a riot response plan to contain any future recurrence.” Nothing, however, was done. The PPP’s refusal to reorganise the GPF as part of a broader program to professionalise the entire Disciplined Forces had always troubled the founders of ROAR.
In addition to Mr. Chase’s conjecture, we wondered, in light of persistent reports of mutinous rumblings within the forces, whether the PPP was paralysed by the possibility of a military coup. Mr Kwayana had also once questioned whether we were not troubled by the destabilising potential of closing off an employment avenue for African youths. Among other imperatives for justice, this was another reason we have always advocated an affirmative action program to encourage African youths into entrepreneurial activities.
The most troubling possible rationale for the PPP’s apathy, however, was offered by ex-GDF officer Malcolm Harripaul, who had joined ROAR after years of membership in the PPP, during which he specialised in security matters. Malcolm proposed bluntly that the communist top leadership of the PPP had absolutely no interest in addressing the un-representativeness of the forces. To do so would be to resolve the security dilemma of their Indian support base and remove the fear that drives them under the PPP’s tent at elections.
Whatever the reasons, the contradictions arising from de-professionalised forces did not disappear: violence rose to unprecedented heights – and unexpected breadth – after 1998. In 2003, under direct Constitutional mandate, a Disciplined Forces Commission (DFC) took submissions across the country on how to professionalise the Forces. They submitted their recommendations in 2004 to Parliament.
On the matter of ethnic representativeness they declared: “The Commission…is of the view that the allaying of ethnic security fears which stems from the predominance of Afro-Guyanese presence in the GPF must be addressed…but to ensure, in so doing, that no similar insecurity fears are caused in the Afro-Guyanese community.”
As ROAR had proposed in its submission, the DFC recommended, “It should be an aim (of the GPF) to achieve a Force representative of the ethnic diversity of the nation without employing a quota system.” The DFC also recommended that, as had the British in this area: “Ethnically diverse recruitment and promotion panels…be employed as openly and extensively as possible.”
The DFC’s Report has been buried in a Parliamentary Committee for the past five years. We call upon the politicians to stop fiddling with the nation’s security. Complete the review of the Report and integrate its recommendations into the SSRP. With or without British help, let us do the right thing: representativeness in the forces must be accomplished “as openly and extensively as possible” as part of its professionalisation. In this age of the IMF’s and the even more intrusive Climate Control conditionalities, “sovereignty” is a protean concept: it is empty if we cannot provide security for our own citizens.

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