Et tu, Mr. Ram?

Nov 08, 2009 Features / Columnists, Ravi Dev

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The exposure of the unpardonable torture of a youth by elements of the police in their investigation of a brutal murder has once again raised the vexed issue of the modus operandi of the GPF. In one intervention in the press, Mr Christopher Ram offered his take on the matter around his major premise: “For most of our post-Independence history, there has been a direct link between the criminal tendencies within the Forces and the political culture that encourages and sustains them.”
The learned member of our judicial system sought to illustrate his thesis in the present by declaring categorically (rather than allegedly): “governmental complicity and action in the murderous campaign by Roger Khan that led to the ultimate torture – death – of several scores of mainly black youths”.
I suppose that Mr Ram has already formed judgement on the claims of the “dossier” compiled by the Joint Parliamentary Opposition Parties (JPOP) – as have most lay persons. I await the deliberations of the Inquiries in train or to be launched.
But what troubled me was the new element Mr Ram interjected when he claimed, once again conclusively: “Prior to that murderous campaign, there were calls for the Indianisation – rather than the professionalisation – of the Force. By chance or design, the rearrangement of the top echelon of the security forces has been accompanied by a noticeable increase of human rights abuses including torture and death.” Mr Ram thus appears to subtly imply that the present eruption of “criminal tendencies” in the GPF is not only a consequence of the endemic “linkage” stated in his major premise but also of calls for an “Indianisation” policy that resulted in “the rearrangement of the top echelon of the security forces”.
As one who has been consistently maligned for allegedly calling for such an “Indianisation” policy for our Disciplined Forces prior to Guyana becoming a killing field, I would like to interrogate Mr Ram’s claims on that aspect. I leave for others to judge how “Indianised” the GPF has become and its correlation with, or causation of, increased police malfeasances.
I would like to state most unequivocally that neither I nor any of the organisations I have been associated with – ROAR and JCD – and as far as I can recollect any other individual or group, have ever called for the “Indianisation” of the Disciplined Forces. What we have called for over two decades is for the administration to institute policies that would make those Forces representative of the population of the country as one aspect – albeit a most important one – in its professionalisation.
Mr Ram knows this not only because of one of the most extensive public debates in the history of this country on this or any issue, but because of my personal interactions with him when I functioned in the official opposition. Hence my disappointment with his assertion.
Our calls for the professionalisation and inclusiveness of our Forces intensified after the ethnic riots of January 12th 1998 when hundreds of Indians were assaulted in Georgetown. Most of the atrocities occurred within minutes of the heavily staffed Brickdam Police station and in the downtown areas that are normally heavily patrolled by the police. Yet as the GIFT Report, which Mr Eusi Kwayana adjudged to be “credible”, reported: Of the 228 statements examined regarding police presence and assistance, fully 170 state that the police were nowhere to be seen. In 26 cases the police were present but rendered no assistance. In 6 cases, the police were present and helped.”
When the criminal depredations against Indians spread nationwide in the ensuing months – against which the Police was alarmingly ineffectual in countering – ROAR (Rise Organise And Rally) against Crime was launched on January 17th 1999. We issued a four-page analysis of the situation that included short, medium and long term recommendations for the Guyana Police Force. Inter alia, we pointed out, “Crime is now finally on the national agenda…This agenda item must, however, cover the overall security interests of the peoples of Guyana and not simply the immediate crime situation, which is but one manifestation of the fundamental ethnic security dilemmas in the country. The GPF, as an institution, captures much of the wider societal contradictions.”
We noted that unlike what Mr Ram claimed to be “criminal tendencies” within the GPF, the latter was explicitly modelled on the Royal Irish Constabulary – designed for pacification of the native population – rather that London Police Force, designed for protecting the citizenry from criminal elements. Criminal behaviour was institutionalised rather than contingent.
Barbadians dominated the early force calculated to prevent empathy with the newly-freed local African slaves. When the latter proved non-threatening, local Africans were differentially recruited to quell perceived threats from the new, burgeoning Indian indentured population. This discriminatory recruitment pattern became accepted as the norm even by Indians in the next century and a half.
We prefaced our recommendations with the following caution: “We should not be stampeded into taking ad hoc initiatives to revamp the Force without formulating a plan to make fundamental changes in its structural bases or the malfunctions will continue unabated. “Modernisation” of the Force must not be equated imply with improved weaponry. The bottom line is that the GPF must be reoriented in its mission away from its authoritarian roots towards operating in a democracy: to alter its focus from serving the state to serving Guyanese citizens. (bold in original)
Our medium and long term strategic recommendations were focused on four areas: making the GPF more representative; more decentralised, more supplemented and more streamlined.
To make it more representatives, we eschewed quotas and advocated targets and goals. There was to be no affirmative action – just an increased emphasis on the recruitment of Indians and Amerindians until the targets were achieved.
Because of the sprawling and diversified nature of our country, we thought that a decentralised police force was self evident. We suggested that the GPF should be supplemented by community policing and a Militia/Home Guard.
Showing that only 30% of the force was engaged in crime fighting, we suggested that it be streamlined by spinning off Immigration and passports, guard training and hiring civilians to handle routine clerical tasks etc.
The fourteen near-term detailed recommendations included a commission to draft a comprehensive national reorganisation plan; increase salaries and equipment; boosting training with US, UN or British help; establish an Internal Affairs Bureau with members from within and without the GPF to root out police misconduct and: “Invite the US DEA to establish a presence in Guyana in establishing recruiting, training and maintaining an anti-drug agency here to address the burgeoning drug trafficking trade.” These were later presented to Minister Gajraj by Malcolm Harripaul and myself.
And Mr Ram asserts that there were calls for “the Indianisation – rather than the professionalisation – of the Force”. Et tu, Mr Ram?

(Next week we continue with the root and branch reform in ethnic representativeness the British instituted in their Police Forces after a single act of racial insensitivity in 1993 and enquired into in 2000. The London Police, for instance, set a target of 25% minority recruitment by this yearend.)

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